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Readability of 10-K Reports and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study shows that less readable 10-K reports are associated with higher stock price crash risk. 
The results are consistent with the argument that managers can successfully hide adverse 
information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the 
hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Cross-sectional analyses show that the 
effect of financial reporting complexity on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with 
persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, greater chief executive 
officer stock option incentives, or lower litigation risk. Finally, accrual manipulation appears to 
be positively related to crash risk, even since the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, if the manipulation is 
accompanied by complex 10-K reports. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate managers have incentives to maximize investors’ perceptions of firm value as 
reflected by stock prices. One way for managers to maintain the current level of stock prices is to 
obfuscate adverse information in financial reports because information that is more costly to 
extract from public disclosures is less completely revealed in market prices (Bloomfield 2002). 
Moreover, because of the feedback role of historical financial reports, managers hiding bad news 
elsewhere could also supply less readable annual reports to the stock market to prevent investors 
from obtaining any clues about their opportunistic behavior (Li 2008). Consistent with this 
observation, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently been working on 
the textual analysis of annual reports to identify clues of potential earnings manipulation 
(Eaglesham 2013). In this paper, we examine whether complex language in annual reports is 
associated with future stock price crashes. Stock price crashes often have a devastating effect on 
investor welfare and it is therefore important to understand their determinants. 
Jin and Myers (2006) have built a model in which some degree of opaqueness is essential 
for the occurrence of stock price crashes. While the natural arrival process of new information 
does not systematically differ between good and bad news, strategic bad news hoarding behavior 
by managers can make bad news lumpier than good news. In the model of Jin and Myers, lack of 
transparency enables managers to capture a portion of positive cash flows, hiding and personally 
absorbing negative firm-specific performance to protect their jobs. However, when the 
accumulation of bad news reaches a threshold, it will become too difficult or costly for managers 
to continue withholding it and they will therefore exercise the abandonment option. The 
previously unobserved negative information thus becomes public all at once, leading to stock 
price crashes. Therefore, if complex financial reports facilitate managers’ hiding of adverse 
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information, we expect less readable 10-K reports to be associated with more negatively skewed 
future returns or a higher likelihood of crashes, or, put simply, higher crash risk. 
Following Li (2008), a growing literature uses the Fog Index as a measure of 10-K report 
readability. This measure, which originated from the computational linguistics literature, 
captures a document’s level of complexity as a function of the number of syllables per word and 
the number of words per sentence. However, Loughran and McDonald (2014) argue that this 
traditional Fog Index can be poorly specified, because a large number of multisyllabic words, 
such as company, corporation, and telecommunications, in business texts are well understood by 
investors. Bearing this criticism in mind, we extract complex words (i.e., words with more than 
two syllables) from the Compustat variable lists and the Fama–French 49-industry description 
file and build a list of complex words that are presumably easy to comprehend in the context of 
financial disclosures. We then construct a modified Fog Index by reclassifying the complex 
words in our list as simple ones when parsing 10-K filings. We show that the modified Fog Index 
passes the validity tests recommended by Loughran and McDonald (2014). 
Using the modified Fog Index as a measure of financial disclosure readability, we show 
that less readable 10-K reports are associated with more negatively skewed returns, or higher 
stock price crash risk, suggesting that managers can withhold adverse information by writing 
more complex financial reports. The results hold even after controlling for earnings management 
and other fundamental determinants of crash risk. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the 
association between financial reporting readability and crash risk is stronger for firms with 
persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, suggesting that such firms 
are more likely to hide adverse information using complex language (Li 2008). In addition, we 
find that the association between readability and crash risk is more pronounced when a firm’s 
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litigation risk is lower or when managers have more equity option incentives. Similar to Hutton 
et al. (2009), we find that earnings management predicts crash risk in the years before the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) but not afterward in the full sample. Interestingly, we show that 
earnings management is positively associated with crash risk for firms with less readable 10-K 
reports, even in the post-SOX period. These results suggest that complex financial reports appear 
to enhance the effectiveness of earnings management in hiding bad news (or to decrease the 
likelihood of earnings management being detected), particularly in the post-SOX period. 
We conduct a series of robustness checks and additional tests. First, the results continue 
to hold after controlling for firm fixed effects and various time-varying determinants of 10-K 
readability. Second, we find that changes in 10-K complexity are positively related to changes in 
future crash risk, after controlling for changes in various measures of fundamental risk. Third, 
the results are robust to alternative measures of financial reporting complexity. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this study is one of 
the first to show that complex annual reports facilitate managerial news hoarding and increase 
the likelihood of future stock price crashes. In a related study, Li (2008) finds no robust evidence 
that less readable financial reports are associated with lower returns in the following 12 months 
(i.e., the first moment of the stock return distribution). We argue, however, that skewness, or 
large, negative outliers in stock returns (i.e., the third moment of the stock return distribution), is 
a more powerful indicator of adverse information hiding than the first moment is, because the 
former can help pinpoint managerial abandonment and the resulting sudden release of 
accumulated bad news (Jin and Myers 2006).
1
 In addition, a recent stream of literature provides 
mounting evidence that supports the usefulness of negative return skewness or crash risk in 
                                                          
1
 Note that the first moment of return distribution (i.e., average returns) cannot differentiate stocks with large, 
negative price drops within a short period of time (e.g., one week) from stocks with a steady price decline over a 
long period of time (e.g., one year).  
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capturing bad news hoarding (e.g., Callen and Fang 2013; DeFond et al. 2015; Hong et al. 2017; 
Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a, b).  
Second, our findings contribute to the growing literature on the determinants of stock 
price crash risk. Crashes have a devastating effect on investor welfare. This is the case even 
when the stock returns for the entire year or longer are not affected, because investors suffering 
from a crash may not be those earning high returns outside of the crash period. On average, one 
should observe that less informed investors suffer the losses from a crash, while more informed 
investors grab gains, say, prior to the crash. Therefore, understanding the determinants of crash 
risk allows regulators and governance practitioners to design mechanisms to mitigate such risk, 
which is important in recovering and maintaining investor confidence (Blanchard 2009). 
Moreover, investors’ exposure to crash risk (i.e., the risk of extreme losses rather than the risk of 
return volatility) can be reduced only by screening and not by diversification (Sunder 2010). Our 
paper identifies 10-K readability as one potential factor for screening the risk of extreme losses. 
This finding would be of practical relevance for risk management applications focusing on tail 
events and allows investors to minimize their portfolios’ exposure to crash risk and improve 
investment performance (Ak et al. 2016; Hutton et al. 2009). In a broader sense, we provide 
empirical evidence that corroborates the survey result that opaque SEC filing is one of the red 
flags for the misrepresentation of economic performance (Dichev et al. 2013).  
Third, our research contributes to the literature on the real effects of the textual 
complexity of financial reporting. Prior research mainly focuses on the effects of disclosure 
complexity on investors’ or analysts’ behavior rather than their real welfare (e.g., Lehavy et al. 
2011; Miller 2010; You and Zhang 2009). One exception is the work of Biddle et al. (2009), who 
show that firms issuing less readable 10-K reports have lower investment efficiency. Our study 
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extends this line of research by showing that the textual complexity of financial reports is 
associated with a higher incidence of stock price crashes, which potentially significantly destroy 
shareholder welfare (DeFond 2010). 
In a concurrent paper, Ertugrul et al. (2017) find that banks charge higher interest rates 
for loans issued to borrowing firms with larger 10-K report file sizes. They explain that this 
results from borrowing firms hiding bad news through complex annual reports and support this 
argument by showing that 10-K file size is positively related to subsequent crash risk. Our paper 
differs from theirs in at least three ways. First, while Ertugrul et al. focus on 10-K file size as the 
measure of information obfuscation, we use a modified version of the Fog Index that directly 
addresses the concerns raised by Loughran and McDonald (2014).
2
 It is worth noting that 10-K 
file size has a severe measurement error problem in gauging information obfuscation, since 
graphics, HTML, and XBRL significantly enlarge the file sizes of 10-K reports but actually 
reduce the difficulty of gathering and processing information.
3
 Second, we find that the positive 
relation between 10-K complexity and subsequent crash risk is more pronounced for firms that 
report transitory positive earnings news and persistent negative earnings news. According to 
Bloomfield (2008), this result is essential for linking low readability to the information 
obfuscation argument and mitigating the concern of alternative explanations because firms with 
transitory good performance or persistent poor performance indeed have bad news to obfuscate. 
Third, our paper shows that low 10-K readability strengthens the association between earnings 
management and subsequent crash risk, especially in the post-SOX period. This result indicates 
that managers could use textual information obfuscation and earnings manipulation as 
                                                          
2
 See section 3 for the detailed procedure of constructing the modified Fog Index. 
3
 However, in the other direction, Allee et al. (2018) suggest that there is an increasing use of computer programs to 
process firm disclosures and that graphics and exhibits may increase the difficulty of gathering and processing 
information by computer programs. 
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complementary tools for hiding bad news, particularly when earnings manipulation is under 
more stringent public scrutiny and regulatory monitoring. Overall, our paper contributes to the 
literature beyond the scope of the study of Ertugrul et al. (2017). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and develops 
the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample selection and variable measurement. Section 4 
presents our main empirical analyses. Section 5 conducts robustness checks and additional tests. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
Corporate managers have an informational advantage over investors regarding the 
profitability and risks of their firms’ business. The 10-K reports are one of the most 
comprehensive and credible channels through which managers convey their superior information 
to outside investors. Although many of the key numbers in the financial statements have already 
been disclosed well before the 10-K report filing dates, other sections of the reports, such as the 
Management Discussion and Analysis, provide investors with new and important supplementary 
information (Brown and Tucker 2011; Feldman et al. 2010; Griffin 2003; Jegadeesh and Wu 
2013; Kothari et al. 2009a; Li 2010a; Loughran and McDonald 2011; You and Zhang 2009). 
Managers are required to explain in the 10-K reports the key driving forces responsible for 
changes in current performance, which helps investors to determine whether current performance 
is indicative of future performance. 
Moreover, due to the limitations of accounting rules, financial statement information may 
not be able to capture the development of a firm’s key success factors. For example, accounting 
rules do not allow managers to capitalize investments in research and development, employee 
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training, or customer relations. The cash flow and risk implications of these investments, 
however, are critical to a firm’s future performance. The 10-K report provides managers with a 
vehicle to disclose these types of critical inside information (e.g., Campbell et al. 2014; Kravet 
and Muslu 2013; Li 2006; Li et al. 2013; Merkley 2014). Finally, the notes to financial 
statements allow investors to understand how the accounting system maps the firm’s business 
economics to the numbers presented in the financial statements. In addition, these notes enable 
investors to evaluate whether the performance changes are driven by real business trends or 
changes in accounting policies or estimations, which facilitates their judgment concerning the 
persistence of earnings performance. 
However, a 10-K report is only used by investors when they can process the content of 
the report cost-effectively. Using a noisy rational expectation model, Grossman and Stigliz (1980) 
demonstrate that, in efficient markets, the returns to analyzing data should equal the cost of 
analysis. Based on this insight, Bloomfield (2002, 235) proposes the incomplete revelation 
hypothesis (IRH) that “[s]tatistics that are more costly to extract from public data are less 
completely revealed by market prices.” Bloomfield further conjectures that managers can seek to 
prevent stock prices from declining by strategically increasing the processing cost of negative 
information. One could argue that, to maintain the current level of stock prices, managers can 
simply omit adverse information from the financial reports. We argue, however, that litigation 
and reputation concerns dissuade managers from the outright omission of important adverse 
information (e.g., Skinner 1994). 
Li (2008) offers the first large-sample evidence supporting the IRH. Specifically, the 
author shows that firms with losses or transitory profits write more complex annual reports. The 
author, however, finds no robust evidence of the complexity of financial reports being negatively 
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associated with the average level of stock returns over a 12-month period after the 10-K filing 
date. Li and Zhang (2015) find that managers strategically increase the complexity of bad news 
financial reports when under greater short-selling pressure to maintain the current level of stock 
prices, but the authors do not examine whether the obfuscation strategy is effective in 
maintaining stock prices. Thus, to our best knowledge, the literature does not document clear 
evidence on whether managers can successfully hide adverse information and maintain stock 
prices by writing complex disclosures. 
Our study extends this literature by examining the effect of 10-K report readability on 
future return skewness or crash risk. Jin and Myers (2006) develop a model with incomplete 
transparency and predict that the managerial tendency to withhold bad news leads to occasional 
stock price crashes when the accumulated bad news reaches a tipping point. Consistent with this 
prediction, a growing body of research suggests that crash risk, or, more generally, negative 
return skewness, is associated with various incentives and mechanisms for managers to hide bad 
news. Hutton et al. (2009) find that accrual earnings management is associated with crash risk in 
the pre-SOX period. Kim et al. (2011a) show that complex tax shelter arrangements facilitate 
managerial bad news hoarding and increase crash risk. DeFond et al. (2015) provide evidence 
that the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards is associated with a 
lower negative skewness of stock returns for non-financial firms, but not for financial firms. Kim 
and Zhang (2016) show that conservative accounting policies help mitigate bad news hoarding 
and reduce stock price crash risk. In addition, Kim et al. (2011b) provide evidence that chief 
financial officers’ equity incentives motivate them to shelter bad news, as reflected by stock 
price crashes. Callen and Fang (2013) find that monitoring by institutional investors reduces 
crash risk. 
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We argue that complex financial reports increase information opacity and thus enable 
managers to hide adverse information for extended periods, up to a threshold. Once the threshold 
is crossed, the adverse information is suddenly released all at once, resulting in a stock price 
crash (Jin and Myers 2006).
4
 Therefore, we predict a positive association between the 
complexity of 10-K reports and future stock price crash risk. Admittedly, managers can also have 
incentives to withhold good news in some scenarios, for example, when faced with intense 
competition from the product market. However, our argument is based on the assumption that 
managers generally tend to withhold or delay the disclosure of bad news. This assumption is 
consistent with the evidence documented by many prior studies (e.g., Kothari et al. 2009b). 
Moreover, prior research on 10-K readability suggests that managers tend to use complex writing 
to obfuscate adverse information rather than positive information (e.g., Li 2008; Li and Zhang 
2015).
5
 It is worth noting that the existence of stock price crashes does not necessarily mean 
lower average returns over a longer window. Jin and Myers (2006) imply that investors could 
partially anticipate stock price crashes and demand compensation for losses in a crash and crash-
prone stocks could thus have higher required returns. In addition, in periods before crash events, 
stocks are likely overvalued because of the hidden bad news.  
 
HYPOTHESIS. Firms with less readable 10-K reports have higher future stock price 
crash risk. 
 
 
While we consider complex financial reports a way to obfuscate information, complex 
language could also be necessary to convey complex information and informative technical 
                                                          
4
 Before bad news has accumulated to the tipping point, some (but not all) investors may incur the high cost of 
information processing and avoid the loss by selling stocks before stock price crashes.  
5
 In an untabulated test, we find no evidence that 10-K complexity is positively related to stock price jumps, 
suggesting that managers are unlikely to hide good news by writing complex reports. 
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details about the economic complexity of firms’ business transactions and operating strategies 
(e.g., Bloomfield 2008; Bushee et al. 2018). If the information communication role of complex 
10-K reports dominates their information obfuscation role, we would observe a negative relation 
between 10-K report complexity and future crash risk. This prediction adds tension to our 
empirical prediction. On the other hand, complex 10-K reports could also be positively 
associated with crash risk because complex reports reflect the underlying (high) risk of the firm’s 
business due to the economic complexity of its business transactions. In our empirical analysis, 
we carefully address these concerns in several ways. First, one key innovation of our research is 
that we develop a refined measure of Fog Index that excludes common accounting and finance 
words from the list of complex words. We argue that it is more likely that managers use these 
words to convey complex information and informative technical details rather than to obfuscate 
information. Second, using change regressions and a battery of variables capturing fundamental 
risks, we alleviate the concern that our results are simply driven by changes in business risks. 
Finally, we show that our results are robust to controlling for 10-K file size, where file size is 
used as a control for overall business complexity and information quantity. 
 
3. Sample selection, data, and research design 
Sample selection 
Our initial sample includes all firm–years for which a 10-K report with at least 3,000 
words was filed during 1994–2014.6,7 We combine the initial sample with weekly stock return 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and financial data from Compustat. 
                                                          
6
 Our sample period starts in 1994 because it is the first year electronic 10-K filings were available from the SEC’s 
online EDGAR system. The sample period ends in 2014 because our proxies for crash risk are measured one year 
ahead of our test and control variables.  
7
 Following Li (2008), we exclude 10-K filings with fewer than 3,000 words from our initial sample after editing the 
raw filings by the procedure specified in Online Appendix A. 
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Specifically, for each firm–year observation, we match weekly returns to the fiscal year if the 
last trading day of a calendar week falls within the 12-month period ending three months after 
the firm’s fiscal year-end. We then delete observations with non-positive total assets, financial 
firms (Standard Industrial Classification, or SIC, codes 6000–6999), utilities firms (SIC codes 
4900–4999), low-priced firms (fiscal year-end price lower than $1), observations with fewer than 
26 weeks of stock return data, and observations missing financial data used to construct the 
determinants of crash risk. The above procedure yields our sample of 52,879 firm–year 
observations for 7,012 unique firms. 
 
Measuring 10-K readability 
Following Li (2008), we measure 10-K report readability using the following formula for 
the Fog Index: 
Fog = (words per sentence + percentage of complex words) × 0.4,                    (1)  
where complex words are defined as words with three or more syllables.
8
 Higher values of the 
Fog Index indicate that the text is more difficult to understand. Although widely used by the 
accounting and finance literature, Loughran and McDonald (2014, 1645) argue that the second 
component in the Fog Index, so-called complex words, is a poorly specified measure in business 
documents. Many multisyllabic words, such as corporation, company, directors, business, 
                                                          
8
 Other studies that use the Fog Index to measure readability include those of Allee and DeAngelis (2015), Biddle et 
al. (2009), Bonsall and Miller (2017), Bozanic and Thevenot (2015), Bushee et al. (2018), Callen et al. (2013), Guay 
et al. (2016), Laksmana et al. (2012), Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015), Lawrence (2013), Lee (2012), Lehavy et al. 
(2011), Lo et al. (2017), Lundholm et al. (2014), Merkley (2014), Miller (2010), Nelson and Pritchard (2016), and 
Rogers et al. (2014) for corporate disclosures; De Franco et al. (2015) and Hsieh and Hui (2013) for financial 
analysts’ reports; and Dougal et al. (2012) for news articles. 
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operations, and telecommunications, are presumably easy to understand in the context of 
financial disclosures.
9
 
To address Loughran and McDonald’s (2014) concerns, we first construct a list of words 
that have three or more syllables but are not difficult to comprehend in business or financial text. 
Specifically, we manually check the variable lists of all Compustat datasets and collect all 
complex words (i.e., words with at least three syllables) included in the variable descriptions. 
After accounting for inflections, we generate a list of 1,489 words. We also collect all complex 
words included in the Fama–French 49-industry description file. Since the Fama–French industry 
classification scheme is a regrouping of four-digit SIC industries, the file also includes the 
descriptions of the SIC industries. This second list contains 769 words, including inflections, 230 
of which also appear in the first word list. Combining the above two word lists, we end up with 
2,028 different words in total.
10
 An average financial report user should have no difficulty 
understanding the words in the list.
11
 
Next, we calculate a modified Fog Index (MODFOG) by reclassifying the 2,028 words 
that appear in the 10-K reports as two-syllable words. This procedure changes the word 
complexity component of the traditional Fog Index, while leaving the sentence length component 
of the index intact. We then check whether our modified version of the Fog Index can pass the 
validity tests proposed by Loughran and McDonald (2014). Online Appendix C presents the 
design of the validity tests and Table C.1 presents the test results. We find that our modified 
                                                          
9
 Loughran and McDonald (2014) suggest using the file size of 10-K reports as a simple and easy-to-replicate proxy 
for readability. However, this measure also has significant shortcomings (Bonsall et al. 2017). For example, graphics 
and advanced tools such as XBRL potentially reduce information processing costs borne by 10-K readers but 
significantly enlarge the file size of 10-K reports and thus increase gauged reporting complexity. In addition, larger 
10-K filings are likely to indicate greater disclosure quantity rather than poorer disclosure quality. These arguments 
cast doubt on the construct validity of file size measuring annual report readability. 
10
 See Table B.1 in Online Appendix B for our word list. 
11
 We assume that the average reader of financial reports is familiar with general ledger account names and other 
general business terms and has some industry-specific knowledge. 
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version of the Fog Index (MODFOG) has a significant and positive loading on post-filing date 
return volatility after controlling for the 10-K file size (the measure of financial disclosure 
readability proposed by Loughran and McDonald in lieu of the traditional Fog Index), while the 
traditional Fog Index (RAWFOG) loses its statistical significance in the presence of file size. 
These results suggest that our modification procedure successfully addresses Loughran and 
McDonald’s concerns. 
 
Measuring crash risk 
To measure firm-specific stock price crash risk, we first calculate firm-specific weekly 
returns (W) by estimating the following expanded index model for each firm and fiscal year: 
            1       1   2       1              4                1           1      ,                          (2) 
where     ,    , and     are the returns in week   on stock j, the Fama–French value-weighted index 
for industry i, and the CRSP value-weighted market index, respectively, and the fiscal year is 
defined as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end. We include lead 
and lag terms for the market and industry returns to allow for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson 
1979). The firm-specific weekly return for firm j and week  ,    , is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the residual return (     estimated from Eq. (2). Following prior studies, we use three 
measures of crash risk. The first measure is the negative skewness of weekly stock returns (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2001; DeFond et al. 2015; Hong et al. 2017; Kim et al. 2011a, b; Kim and Zhang 
2016; Jin and Myers 2006): 
            (    
  ⁄ ∑   
     (    (    ⁄ (∑   
    ⁄ ,                              (3) 
where    is defined as above. The second crash risk measure is the asymmetric volatility of the 
weekly stock return, DUVOLj,t (e.g., Chen et al. 2001; Hong et al. 2017; Kim et al. 2011b). It is 
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the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of    for down weeks to the standard 
deviation of    for up weeks, where the down (up) weeks are those with    below (above)   ̅̅ ̅̅  
over the fiscal year t. Our third measure is a crash indicator, CRASHj,t, that takes the value of one 
if firm j has at least one    falling 3.09 or more standard deviations below   ̅̅ ̅̅  over the fiscal 
year t and zero otherwise (e.g., Hong et al. 2017; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a, b; Kim 
and Zhang 2016; Kim et al. 2016b). 
 
Research design 
To test our prediction that firms with less readable 10-K reports are subsequently more 
prone to stock price crashes, we estimate the following model: 
C ash_R skt 1    0    1 MODFOGt    2 OPAQUEt      OPAQUEt
2    4 LOGMVt  
     MTBt      LEVt    7 ROAt    8 DTURNt    9 NCSKE t  
   10 SIGMAt    11 RETt    12 BETAt    1  EARNVOLt  
   14 CFVOLt    1  SALESVOLt    1  HHIt   t, (4) 
 
where Crash_Risk is one of the measures discussed earlier (i.e., NCSKEW, DUVOL, or CRASH). 
We run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for NCSKEW and DUVOL and logistic 
regressions for CRASH. Our hypothesis is supported if  1 is positive and significant.  
Consistent with prior studies, we control for a set of known determinants of crash risk.
12
 
First, we include OPAQUE and its squared term, where OPAQUE is the three-year moving sum 
of the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated from the modified Jones model (Hutton et 
al. 2009). We expect  2 to be positive and  3 negative since Hutton et al. (2009) find that firms 
that are more opaque have higher crash risk but that the relation is concave. It is important for 
our paper to show that 10-K readability has incremental explanatory power on crash risk over 
and above the opacity measure of Hutton et al. (2009). Second, we control for market value 
                                                          
12
 See the Appendix for detailed definitions of these control variables. 
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(LOGMV) and market-to-book (MTB) and expect  4 and  5 to be positive since prior studies 
show that large firms and growth firms are more likely to experience crashes (e.g., Chen et al. 
2001; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a, b; Kim and Zhang 2016). Third, financial leverage 
(LEV) should be negatively related to crash risk because more stable, less crash-prone firms are 
more capable of using debt finance (Hutton et al. 2009). Fourth, we control for firm performance 
(ROA). Hutton et al. (2009) suggest that better contemporaneous operating performance is 
associated with lower crash risk. Kim et al. (2011a, b) find that lagged firm performance is also 
negatively associated with crash risk. On the other hand, good operating performance could be a 
manifestation of earnings manipulation. Since prior studies also document higher crash risk for 
firms with more earnings manipulation (Hutton et al. 2009), we make no prediction for the sign 
of  7. Fifth, prior studies find that stocks with higher detrended average monthly turnover 
(DTURN), return skewness (NCSKEW), return volatility (SIGMA), or past returns (RET) are 
more susceptible to crash risk (e.g., Chen et al. 2001; Kim et al. 2011a, b; Kim and Zhang 2016). 
Thus, we include these variables in our model and expect  8,  9,  10, and  11 to be positive.
13
 
Sixth, to help dispel the concern that the effect of readability on crash risk is driven by omitted 
business risk factors, we include several additional control variables, including systematic risk 
(BETA), earnings volatility (EARNVOL), cash flow volatility (CFVOL), and sales volatility 
(SALESVOL). We expect that these proxies for firm risk are positively related to crash risk. 
Finally, firms in more competitive markets could face more risks from the product market and 
have higher crash risk. However, prior research also suggests that product market competition 
acts as an external governance mechanism and increases transparency. We thus control for HHI, 
                                                          
13
 Following prior research, we control for the first, second, and third moments of past stock returns in all models. In 
the model with NCSKEW as the dependent variable, one of the control variables is essentially a lagged dependent 
variable.    
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the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index based on three-digit SIC codes (Giroud and Mueller 2010), but 
make no prediction for the sign of  1 .  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The mean values of our crash risk 
measures NCSKEW, DUVOL, and CRASH are 0.024,  0.051, and 0.225, respectively. The mean 
CRASH indicates that 22.5 percent of the firm–years in our sample experience at least one crash 
week. The unmodified Fog Index, denoted by RAWFOG, has a mean (median) value of 19.693 
(19.592), with a standard deviation of 1.362 and an interquartile range of 1.584. These statistics 
correspond to those of prior studies in the readability literature (e.g., Lehavy et al. 2011; Li 2008; 
Miller 2010), suggesting that our 10-K parsing procedure is reliable without deviating much 
from those of prior studies. The mean RAWFOG of 19.693 indicates that, on average, a reader 
needs more than 19 years of formal education to understand the text of our sample 10-K reports 
on a first reading. The mean (median) value of the modified Fog Index, MODFOG, is 12.957 
(12.768), much lower than that of RAWFOG. Our modification procedure changes the mean 
readability index from a post-graduate to a college-entry level. We interpret the level of 
MODFOG as the number of years of formal education needed for a reader with some financial 
reporting knowledge to understand 10-K reports on the first reading. 
In panel B of Table 1, we sort our sample into tercile groups by the modified Fog Index 
and present the mean values of the one-year-ahead crash risk measures for each group. When 
measuring crash risk by NCSKEW and CRASH, we find that crash risk increases with MODFOG 
and that the differences in crash risk between the high- and low-MODFOG groups are 
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statistically significant, consistent with our prediction that higher crash risk is related to lower 
10-K readability. On the other hand, DUVOL decreases with MODFOG, inconsistent with our 
prediction. It is, however, noteworthy that these univariate comparisons do not consider other 
factors that affect crash risk.
14
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Figure 1 depicts the time trends of RAWFOG and MODFOG, respectively, over the 
period 1994–2014. Panel A shows that the unmodified Fog Index (RAWFOG) gradually 
increases from 1995 to 1999, declines from 1999 to 2002, increases again after the passage of 
SOX in 2002, and finally drops after 2011. The trend of RAWFOG is similar to that reported by 
Li (2008). The time trend of the modified Fog Index, MODFOG, is similar to that of 
RAWFOG.
15
 Overall, it appears that 10-K reports are more difficult to read in the post-SOX 
period than in the pre-SOX period. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Table 2 shows that MODFOG is positively correlated with one-year-ahead NCSKEW and 
CRASH, indicating that firms with less readable 10-K reports have higher subsequent crash risk. 
On the other hand, the correlation between MODFOG and DUVOL is negative, inconsistent with 
our prediction but consistent with the univariate comparison presented in panel B of Table 1. 
Similar to MODFOG, the level of earnings management (OPAQUE) has positive correlations 
with NCSKEW and CRASH but a negative correlation with DUVOL. Further, the correlations 
                                                          
14
 In unreported univariate comparisons, we do not find statistically significant differences in crash risk between the 
low- and medium-MODFOG groups or between the medium- and high-MODFOG groups. 
15
 This is not surprising given that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between RAWFOG and MODFOG is 0.901 
(0.862) in our sample. The high correlation is consistent with our expectation in that (i) the modified Fog Index is 
still based on computational linguistics and thus similar to the raw Fog Index in nature; and (ii) our modification 
procedure alters the complex word component of the Fog Index but leaves the sentence length component intact. 
Despite the high correlation, the modified Fog Index passes the validity test as shown in Online Appendix C. 
 18 
 
 
between MODFOG and OPAQUE are positive and significant, highlighting the importance of 
controlling for earnings management in our regression analyses. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Main results 
In the three columns in Table 3, we report the results where NCSKEW, DUVOL, and 
CRASH are specified as the dependent variable in successive regressions. The coefficient of 
MODFOG is positive and significant in all columns, consistent with our prediction that firms 
with more complex or less readable 10-K reports have higher subsequent stock price crash risk. 
This result strongly supports the prediction of the IRH that managers can successfully block the 
flow of negative information into the stock market by obfuscating textual information in 10-K 
reports. The coefficient of OPAQUE (OPAQUE
2
) is positive (negative) and significant in the 
OLS regressions of NCSKEW and DUVOL, consistent with the findings of Hutton et al. (2009).
16
 
More importantly for our research question, our measure of textual complexity (MODFOG) is 
positive and significant in predicting crash risk, even after controlling for the level of earnings 
management. Our evidence implies that managers use both earnings manipulation and textual 
information obfuscation to withhold bad news from the market. The economic effect of 10-K 
readability on crash risk is comparable to the determinants of crash risk identified by prior 
research. Taking the coefficient of MODFOG in the third column, for example, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the modified Fog Index is associated with a 0.52 percentage point increase 
                                                          
16
 In the logistic regression of CRASH, the coefficient of OPAQUE (OPAQUE
2
) is positive (negative) but 
statistically insignificant. It is worth noting that, compared with Hutton et al. (2009), we include more control 
variables in our model, as well as industry and year fixed effects. In an unreported test, we use their more 
parsimonious model and find a significantly positive (negative) coefficient of OPAQUE (OPAQUE
2
). Taking all of 
our three crash risk measures into account, we support the authors’ finding that earnings manipulation is related to 
subsequent crash risk.  
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in the probability of a crash. For comparison, Hutton et al. (2009) show that a one-standard-
deviation increase in accrual manipulation (OPAQUE) is associated with a 1.73 percentage point 
increase in the crash probability and Kim and Zhang (2016) find that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in accounting conservatism is associated with a 1.23 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of a crash.
17
 Given the rarity of crashes, we argue that these findings are meaningful 
to investors in positioning their investment portfolios to avoid crashes or their purchasing options 
to insure investment performance against crashes (e.g., Ak et al. 2016; Kim and Zhang 2014). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Cross-sectional variation 
Current earnings performance and earnings persistence 
We have established a positive association between the textual complexity of 10-K 
reports and future stock price crash risk, consistent with our prediction that managers can mask 
adverse information by writing more complex financial reports. Bloomfield (2008) suggests that 
the observed effect of textual complexity on bad news hiding varies as a function of the earnings 
profile. Specifically, firms with negative earnings news or transitory good earnings news should 
have more adverse information to obfuscate and thus financial reporting complexity should have 
a stronger effect on future crash risk for firms with negative earnings news or transitory positive 
earnings news. 
                                                          
17
 The relatively lower economic magnitude of the readability effect is driven by two factors: (1) the sample 
variation in the modified Fog Index (MODFOG) is lower relative to abnormal accruals or conservatism (Li 2008) 
and (2) we include many more controls for fundamental risk factors than Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim and Zhang 
(2016) do.    
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To test the above conjecture, we define an earnings increase (i.e., ΔROA > 0) as good 
earnings news and an earnings decrease (i.e., ΔROA < 0) as bad earnings news.18 Panel A of 
Table 4 shows that when crash risk is measured by NCSKEW or DUVOL, the coefficients of 
MODFOG are of greater magnitude and more significant in the subsample of firm–years with 
poor earnings performance. However, the differences in the coefficients of MODFOG between 
the two subsamples are insignificant. In addition, the coefficients of MODFOG are not 
significantly different between the two groups when crash risk is measured by CRASH. The 
somewhat weak results for the moderating effect of current earnings performance in panel A are 
probably due to our lack of distinction between persistent and transitory earnings news. 
We next examine the moderating effect of earnings persistence. We estimate the firm-
specific persistence of earnings news by comparing current-year earnings news with one-year-
ahead earnings news. Specifically, we define current earnings news as persistent (transitory) if 
ΔROA in year t and ΔROA in year t+1 carry the same (opposite) sign. We then decompose 
MODFOGt into MODFOG_PERSISTENTt and MODFOG_TRANSITORYt, where 
MODFOG_PERSISTENTt (MODFOG_TRANSITORYt) equals MODFOGt if ΔROAt+1 carries the 
same (opposite) sign as ΔROAt, and zero otherwise. Panel B of Table 4 shows the clear pattern 
that the positive association between textual complexity and crash risk is more pronounced for 
firm–years with persistent bad earnings news or transitory good earnings news.19 Taken together, 
                                                          
18
 We use ROA to capture earnings performance, a widely used measure of overall firm performance in the capital 
markets. Changes in ROA can be driven by changes in total assets instead of earnings. We argue, however, that an 
increase in ROA driven by a decrease in assets also represents good earnings news, in that the firm earns the same 
amount by employing less invested assets. The results are qualitatively similar if we use earnings per share to 
measure earnings performance. 
19
 In panel A of Table 4, the sample size is 52,860 (= 26,565 + 26,295), slightly smaller than 52,879 in Table 3, 
because we drop observations with ΔROAt equal to zero. In panel B of Table 4, the sample size further drops to 
52,767 (= 2 , 1    2 ,2 1), since we delete observations with missing or zero ΔROAt+1. 
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the results reported in Table 4 provide supporting evidence for our obfuscation argument 
developed from the IRH.
20
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
CEO stock option incentives 
Previous research suggests that managers have greater incentives to hide bad news and 
inflate stock prices if they have more stock option incentives (e.g., Efendi et al. 2007; Kim et al. 
2011b). Thus, if the documented relation between annual report readability and crash risk is 
driven by managerial bad news hoarding, we should observe a stronger effect when managers 
have more stock option incentives. To examine this conjecture, we re-estimate Eq. (4) using 
subsamples partitioned on the magnitude of CEO option incentives. Consistent with Efendi et al. 
(2007), we use in-the-money options holding to gauge option incentive. Overall, the results in 
panel A of Table 5 show that the significant relation between annual report readability and crash 
risk is largely driven by the subsample of firms with large stock option incentives. The 
coefficients of MODFOG are statistically different between the two subsamples for two out of 
three crash risk measures. 
 
Litigation risk 
It is more costly for a manager to withhold bad news if the manager’s firm has higher 
litigation risk. Therefore, we should observe a weaker relation between annual report readability 
and crash risk for firms with higher litigation risk if the relation is indeed driven by bad news 
                                                          
20
 In an untabulated test, we also find that the relation between 10-K readability and subsequent crash risk is more 
pronounced for bad-news 10-K reports, that is, 10-K reports with negative tone relative to the tone of 10-K/10-Q 
reports filed by the same firm in the prior 400 calendar days (Feldman et al. 2010). We use the word lists developed 
by Loughran and McDonald (2011) to estimate the tone of 10-K/10-Q reports. This result is also consistent with our 
obfuscation argument. 
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hiding behavior. Motivated by this logic, we next re-estimate Eq. (4) using two subsamples 
partitioned on the level of litigation risk. Following Kim and Skinner (2012), we estimate the ex 
ante litigation risk for a firm in fiscal year t as follows: 
LITIGATIONt   −7.88    0.   ×FPSt   0. 18×LNASSETSt−1  
  0.982×SALESGR t−1   0. 79×RETt−1 − 0.108×RETSKE t−1  
  2 .   ×RETVOLt−1   7×10
−7×TURNOVERt−1, ( ) 
 
where FPS is an indicator variable for litigious industries that takes the value of one for firms in 
the biotech (SIC codes 2833–2836 or 8731–8734), computer (SIC codes 3570–3577 or 7370–
7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600–3674), or retail (SIC codes 5200–5961) industry and zero 
otherwise (Francis et al. 1994); LNASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets; SALESGRW is 
the change in sales scaled by lagged total assets; RET is the 12-month stock returns adjusted by 
CRSP value-weighted market returns; RETSKEW is the skewness of 12-month stock returns; 
RETVOL is the standard deviation of 12-month stock returns; and TURNOVER is the trading 
volume accumulated over the fiscal year scaled by shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
We report the results in panel B of Table 5. Consistent with our expectations, the relation 
between annual report readability and crash risk is significant only for the subsample of firms 
with low litigation risk. The differences in the coefficients of MODFOG between the two 
subsamples are statistically significant for two out of three crash risk measures. Taken together, 
the cross-sectional results in Tables 4 and 5 further support our conclusion that financial 
reporting complexity is a determinant of stock price crashes. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Readability, earnings management, and SOX 
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While Hutton et al. (2009) show that earnings manipulation leads to crash risk, our paper 
illustrates that textual information obfuscation has an incremental effect on crash risk beyond 
earnings manipulation. Given these results, one could naturally ask whether textual information 
obfuscation and earnings manipulation are interactively used to hide bad news and whether 
managers strategically choose between these two vehicles in hiding bad news. We thus examine 
the joint effects of textual complexity and earnings manipulation on crash risk. 
In panel A of Table 6, we partition our sample into two subsamples based on 10-K 
readability and investigate whether the effect of earnings manipulation on crash risk varies 
systematically with textual information obfuscation. We find that earnings manipulation 
significantly affects crash risk only when 10-K readability is low and that the coefficients of 
OPAQUE and OPAQUE
2
 are significantly different between the two subsamples. These results 
are consistent with the view that earnings manipulation and textual information obfuscation are 
complementary mechanisms for hiding bad news. Put differently, managers are likely to 
obfuscate textual disclosure in 10-K reports to mask earnings manipulation, which makes it 
difficult for investors to detect earnings manipulation (e.g., Lo et al. 2017). In this sense, 
disclosure complexity also has an indirect effect on crash risk in addition to the direct effect 
shown in Table 3. 
Hutton et al. (2009) show that the power of accrual manipulation to predict crash risk has 
waned since the passage of SOX and attribute this change to increased penalties for earnings 
manipulation in the post-SOX period. In an unreported test, we find similar patterns. Given the 
results in panel A of Table 6 that firms can use textual information obfuscation as a mask for 
earnings manipulation, we next examine the effect of SOX on the complementary relation 
between the two. On one hand, the deterrent effect of SOX could be large enough and thus 
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substantially discourage any attempts to manipulate earnings and hide bad news. On the other 
hand, managers are likely to rely more on textual information obfuscation as a subtle and 
unregulated approach to mask their earnings manipulation intent and activities. 
Panel B of Table 6 shows no clear pattern for the joint effects of earnings manipulation 
and textual information obfuscation on crash risk in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, panel C of 
Table 6 shows that, in the post-SOX period, the effect of earnings manipulation on crash risk is 
positive and significant for firms with less readable 10-K reports but insignificant for firms with 
more readable 10-K reports. The subsample differences are statistically significant. These results 
suggest that managers are more likely to use complex language to hide accrual manipulation in 
the post-SOX period and that the strategy appears to be effective. The results complement the 
findings of Hutton et al. (2009) by showing that accrual manipulation is related to crash risk even 
in the post-SOX period if managers can mask their manipulation by writing more complex 
financial reports. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5. Robustness checks and additional tests 
Omitted variables 
In our main regression specification, we have included a battery of control variables to 
help confront the concern that our results are driven by other determinants of crash risk or 
omitted business risk factors. In this subsection, we gauge the severity of the omitted variable 
problem following the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005). Specifically, we estimate the degree of 
selection on observables and use it as a guide for the degree of selection on unobservables. 
Toward this end, Table D.1 in Online Appendix D includes the main determinants of financial 
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reporting complexity as additional control variables (Li 2008): firm age (AGE), special items (SI), 
operational complexity (NBSEG and NGSEG), financial complexity (NITEM), unusual corporate 
events (SEO and MA), and incorporation state (DLW).
21
 As shown in Table D.1, the coefficients 
of MODFOG continue to be significantly positive and become slightly larger in magnitude 
relative to those reported in Table 3. This result suggests that the omitted variable bias is unlikely 
to be severe. The reasoning is that if some unobserved variables were to explain our main results, 
the unobserved variables would have to be uncorrelated with observable confounds and their 
effects on crash risk would have to be economically huge. 
We next conduct a falsification test following Christensen et al. (2016) and Ljungqvist et 
al. (2017). Specifically, we first estimate regressions of crash risk on the determinants of 
financial reporting complexity and obtain the predicted values of crash risk. Then, we regress the 
predicted values of crash risk on financial reporting complexity (i.e., MODFOG) and control 
variables, as in Table 3. Under the assumption that the observed or unobserved selection 
variables induce a spurious relation between crash risk and readability, the coefficients of 
MODFOG should be similar to those in Table 3. However, the results in Table D.2 in Online 
Appendix D show that the coefficients of MODFOG are tiny and statistically insignificant in the 
falsification test. Again, these results suggest that the omitted variable bias is not severe in our 
setting. 
Although the falsification tests suggest that omitted variables or reverse causality is 
unlikely to drive our main results, we next use firm fixed effect regressions and change analysis 
to further alleviate endogeneity concerns. Table D.3 in Online Appendix D shows that the 
coefficients of MODFOG are positive and significant at least at the 5 percent level in all columns 
                                                          
21
 See the Appendix for definitions. The determinants of 10-K readability identified by Li (2008) also include firm 
size, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, and return volatility. These variables are already included in our main 
regression model. 
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after we include firm fixed effects in the regressions.
22
 Table D.4 in Online Appendix D presents 
the change regressions.
23
 The coefficient of ΔMODFOG is significantly positive at the 5 (10) 
percent level when ΔNCSKEWt+1 or ΔDUVOLt+1 (ΔCRASHt 1) is used as the dependent 
variable.
24,25
 The results suggest that changes in the level of financial reporting complexity in 
year t are positively and significantly associated with changes in crash risk in year t+1 after 
controlling for changes in other determinants of crash risk and changes in various measures of 
business risks. 
Finally, we examine whether the positive association between financial reporting 
complexity and subsequent crash risk holds after controlling for several other factors that shape 
crash risk documented by recent studies. We particularly consider accounting conservatism (Kim 
and Zhang 2016), corporate tax avoidance (Kim et al. 2011a), stock liquidity (Chang et al. 2017), 
CEO overconfidence (Kim et al. 2016b), and accounting comparability (Kim et al. 2016a). Table 
D.5 in Online Appendix D presents the results.
 
Our key variable, MODFOG, remains 
                                                          
22
 We drop NCSKEWt from the model in this test to avoid dynamic panel biases caused by including a lagged crash 
risk measure in firm fixed effect regressions (Nickell 1981). Intuitively, both lagged crash risk and firm fixed effects 
can capture time-invariant firm-specific factors that potentially affect crash risk, and we thus do not need to include 
both in the model. In any event, the results are similar if we include NCSKEWt in the regression. 
23
 In Table D.4 in Online Appendix D, we use ΔABACC_DD instead of ΔOPAQUE and ΔOPAQUE2, where 
ABACC_DD is the absolute value of the cross-sectional regression residuals from the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model 
modified by Francis et al. (2005). Specifically, for each industry and year, we estimate a regression of current 
accruals on lagged, contemporaneous, and forward operating cash flows, changes in sales revenue, and property, 
plant, and equipment. We choose this measure for two reasons. First, it is difficult to interpret the first difference of 
OPAQUE, the three-year moving average of abnormal accruals. Second, changes in ABACC estimated from the 
modified Jones model may not capture changes in earnings management because the modified Jones model does not 
consider whether accruals can be mapped to realizations of operating cash flows. In untabulated tests, we find that 
our results are qualitatively unchanged by using (i) the first difference of an earnings management measure that 
explicitly accounts for accrual reversals (Dechow et al. 2012) and (ii) the first difference of a meet or beat measure 
that does not rely on any accrual model. Our results are also similar if we simply use OPAQUE or ABACC in the 
change regression. 
24
 In the ΔCRASHt 1 regression, we only keep observations with ΔCRASHt 1 equal to zero or one. The coefficient of 
ΔMODFOGt remains positive but loses significance (p = 0.182) if we keep the observations with ΔCRASHt 1 equal 
to −1. 
25
 Similar to our firm fixed effect regressions, we drop ΔNCSKEWt from our change model. Including ΔNCSKEWt 
does not materially change our results. 
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significantly positive at least at the 5 percent level in all regressions, indicating that 10-K 
readability has explanatory power for subsequent crash risk over and above these factors.
26
 
 
Alternative measures of 10-K readability 
In our main tests, we use the modified Fog Index as the measure of readability. In this 
subsection, we check the robustness of our main results to the use of alternative readability 
measures. The first alternative measure that we analyze is the modified version of the Flesch 
Reading Ease Score. The Flesch Reading Ease Score, which also originates from computational 
linguistics, is another popular readability index used in accounting research (e.g., De Franco et al. 
2015; Li 2008). We calculate the measure using the following formula: 
Flesch = 206.835 − (1.015 × words per sentence) − (84.6 × syllables per word).             (6)  
The higher the Flesch Reading Ease Score, the easier it is to understand the text. For convenience 
in expressing and interpreting our results, we take the negative value of the Flesch Reading Ease 
Score to make it directionally consistent with our other measures of readability. Similar to the 
modification of the Fog Index explained in section 3, we modify the Flesch Reading Ease Score 
by treating all words listed in Online Appendix B as two-syllable words. The resulting modified 
score (MODFLESCH) is our first alternative readability measure.
27
 
Our second alternative measure is the unmodified Fog Index (RAWFOG). Note, however, 
that the unmodified Fog Index may be misspecified in the context of financial disclosures 
(Loughran and McDonald 2014). The third alternative measure of financial reporting complexity 
                                                          
26
 We thank Rodrigo Verdi for sharing the SAS program for constructing the accounting comparability measure. 
27
 Another popular readability index is the Kincaid Index, calculated as (11.8 × syllables per word) + (0.39 × words 
per sentence) − 15.59. The higher the Kincaid Index, the more difficult it is to understand the text. We also create a 
modified version of the Kincaid Index in the same way that we constructed the modified Fog Index and Flesch 
Reading Ease Score. Since the modified Kincaid Index has nearly perfect correlations with the modified Fog Index 
(0.987 Pearson and 0.980 Spearman) in our sample, we do not report the results using the modified Kincaid Index to 
measure readability. 
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under study is the length of 10-K filings, LENGTH, which is the logarithm of the number of 
words in the edited 10-K files (e.g., Lawrence 2013; Lee 2012; Li 2008; Miller 2010; Peterson 
2012; You and Zhang 2009). Longer financial reports are harder to read.
28
 Our final measure is 
the file size of 10-K filings, FILESIZE, which is constructed following Loughran and McDonald 
(2014). These authors show that the unmodified Fog Index has no power in explaining their 
proxies for the information environment when they control for file size. We thus also examine 
whether the linguistics-based measures predict crash risk after controlling for file size. 
Table D.6 in Online Appendix D presents the regression results using alternative 
measures of readability. All the above alternative readability measures except FILESIZE are 
significantly associated with future crash risk in the predicted direction.
29
 In addition, Table D.6 
shows that the power of the linguistics-based readability indices in predicting crash risk is not 
affected by controlling for the file size measure. Overall, the results in Table D.6 suggest that our 
main results are robust to alternative readability measures and that the modified readability 
indices have the power to explain crash risk, even when the regression model includes the file 
size measure. 
 
Readability of 10-K reports around crash events 
Our argument for the relation between 10-K readability and subsequent crash risk is that 
low readability helps managers stockpile negative information up to a tipping point and, 
afterward, a large amount of negative information is abruptly released to the market, resulting in 
                                                          
28
 A problem with the length measure is that longer 10-K reports can indicate greater information content rather than 
complexity (Li 2010b). 
29
 The insignificant result for FILESIZE is probably driven by the SEC’s XBRL mandate. When we limit our sample 
period to 1994–2008, the coefficient of FILESIZE is significantly positive at the 1 percent level. This is not 
surprising, in that XBRL significantly enlarges the 10-K file size, but this does not mean that 10-K reports become 
more complex or less readable. In fact, the purpose of XBRL adoption is to reduce information processing costs. 
Our results imply that 10-K file size may not be an effective readability measure, especially in the post-XBRL 
mandate era. 
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a sudden stock price decline. One could naturally ask what happens to 10-K readability after a 
crash event, in which the previously suppressed bad news is all released. To provide descriptive 
evidence on this issue, we match a firm with no crash event over the whole sample period (non-
crash firm) with each firm with only one crash event (crash firm), assign a pseudo crash year for 
each matched non-crash firm, and compare their 10-K readability from three years before the 
crash event to one year afterward.
30
 Figure 2 suggests that, for firms experiencing a stock price 
crash, the complexity of 10-K reports (proxied by the modified Fog Index) rises prior to the 
crash, peaks in the year right before the crash, and then drops after the crash. While crash firms 
generally have less readable 10-K reports than non-crash firms do, the two groups appear to 
exhibit the greatest difference one year before the crash event and converge after the crash. We, 
however, caution that the evidence presented in Figure 2 is descriptive rather than conclusive.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Alternative methods of modifying the Fog Index 
In our main test, we identify a list of multisyllabic words from the Compustat variable 
definitions and the Fama–French industry description file, reclassify them as two-syllable words, 
and construct readability indices using the modified percentage of complex words or the 
modified number of syllables per word. An alternative way of modifying the readability indices 
is to use a term-weighting scheme to discount the role of high-frequency multisyllabic words in 
decreasing the calculated readability of 10-K reports. The rationale is that a word that appears in 
                                                          
30
 Specifically, we run a logistic regression of CRASH on the crash determinants and the readability determinants 
included in Table D.1 in Online Appendix D measured one year prior to the crash event, using firms with only one 
crash event or no crash event over the whole sample period. We drop firms with multiple crash events to avoid the 
confounding effect of one crash event on another. For each crash firm, we assign the non-crash firm with the closest 
propensity score using a caliper of 0.001 as the control firm, without replacement. This one-to-one matching 
procedure yields 861 pairs of crash and non-crash firms. We also assign a pseudo crash year to each matched non-
crash firm. 
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more (fewer) 10-K reports should be more (less) familiar to investors with experience in reading 
10-K reports and thus less (more) difficult to understand. We refer readers to Online Appendix E 
for details on this alternative modification method. Untabulated tests suggest that the modified 
Fog Index based on this term-weighting approach: (i) also passes the validity test recommended 
by Loughran and McDonald (2014), although not as strongly as that based on our word-list 
approach; and (ii) loads positively in Eq. (4) for all of our three measures of crash risk. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We find that firms with less readable 10-K reports have higher stock price crash risk. In 
addition, we show that the relation between financial reporting complexity and crash risk is more 
pronounced for firms with persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, 
consistent with Bloomfield’s (2008) prediction that these types of firms have more bad news to 
obscure. Further, the association between textual complexity and crash risk is more pronounced 
for firms with high CEO option incentives or low litigation risk, supporting a bad news hoarding 
interpretation of our results. Finally, we show that accrual manipulation is positively associated 
with crash risk for firms with less readable 10-K reports, even in the post-SOX period. 
Our study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of financial reporting 
complexity on crash risk, a previously unexplored implication of textual complexity in financial 
reporting. Together with the findings of Li (2008), our results suggest that managers have both 
incentives and abilities to hide adverse information by writing more complex financial reports, 
consistent with the predictions of the IRH. In addition, we identify complex narratives as one 
potential factor for screening the risk of extreme losses, which is hard to reduce by 
diversification. This also echoes the SEC’s view reported by Eaglesham (2013) that the textual 
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analysis of securities filings is useful in detecting managerial opportunistic behavior. Moreover, 
unlike prior studies that focus on the effect of disclosure complexity on the information 
environment or investors’ and analysts’ behavior, our paper sheds light on the real effects of 
disclosure complexity by focusing on stock price crashes, which have the potential to 
significantly destroy investor welfare. 
Our paper has at least two limitations. First, we do not explore whether and how the bad 
news obfuscated in annual reports is released through subsequent disclosures, particularly the 
textual information in those disclosures. Future research could use more advanced methodologies 
(e.g., topic modeling algorithms) to compare the topics covered in unreadable 10-K reports with 
those covered in subsequent earnings press releases, management forecast press releases, or 8-K 
filings, which potentially release stockpiled bad news and result in a stock price crash. Second, 
we do not account for differences among investors or wealth transfer from one group of investors 
to another around stock price crashes. On average, it could be that less informed investors suffer 
losses stemming from a crash but more informed investors enjoy the gains prior to it. Who sells 
right before a crash? Does the low readability of corporate disclosures create an unlevel playing 
field where large, skillful, informed investors avoid losses in a crash and leave other investors 
trapped? We leave these questions to future research. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Dependent variables: Crash risk measures 
CRASHt 1 An indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one value of  over the fiscal 
year t 1 falls 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean   for the fiscal year and 
zero otherwise. W is firm-specific weekly return, defined as the natural logarithm of one 
plus the residual return from estimating the following expanded index for each firm and 
each fiscal year: 
                                                              , 
where j, m, and i denote firm, market, and industry, respectively. 
DUVOLt 1 The natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of   for the down weeks to 
the standard deviation of   for the up weeks, where the down and up weeks are those 
with  below and above, respectively, the mean over the fiscal year t 1.  is defined 
above. 
NCSKE t 1 The negative skewness of  over fiscal year t 1. A fiscal year is defined as the 12-
month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end in constructing the crash risk 
measures and other stock return variables to avoid look-ahead biases.  is defined 
above.  
  
Key variable: Modified Fog Index 
MODFOGt The modified Fog Index of the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is 
calculated as (words per sentence   percentage of complex words) × 0.4. A higher Fog 
Index means the report is more difficult to read. To capture readability in the financial 
(versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables 
but which are not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as 
simple words in calculating MODFOG.  
  
Alternative readability measures 
FILESIZEt The natural logarithm of the file size (in megabytes) of the 10-K report filed for fiscal 
year t. 
LENGTHt The natural logarithm of the total number of words of the 10-K report filed for fiscal 
year t. 
MODFLESCHt The modified Flesch Reading Ease Score of the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The 
Flesch Reading Ease Score is calculated as 20 .8   − (1.01  × words per sentence) − 
(84.  × syllables per word). A higher Flesch Reading Ease Score means the report is 
more readable. To capture readability in the financial (versus general) context, we 
identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables but which are not difficult to 
understand in the financial context and reclassify them as two-syllable words in 
calculating MODFLESCH. For convenience in expressing and interpreting our results, 
we take the negative value. 
RA FOGt The Fog Index of the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t, calculated as (words per 
sentence   percentage of complex words) × 0.4. A higher Fog Index means the report is 
more difficult to read. 
  
Control variables: Determinants of crash risk 
BETAt The market beta estimated from the capital asset pricing model using daily stock returns 
and value-weighted market returns over fiscal year t. 
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CFVOLt The standard deviation of operating cash flows (#oancf) scaled by lagged total assets 
(#at) over the five fiscal years from t−4 to t. 
DTURNt The average monthly share turnover over fiscal year t minus the average monthly share 
turnover over fiscal year t−1. The monthly share turnover is calculated as the trading 
volume over the month scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of 
the month.  
EARNVOLt The standard deviation of ROA over the five fiscal years from t−4 to t. 
HHIt The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index based on three-digit SIC codes. 
LEVt Total liabilities (#lt) scaled by the book value of total assets (#at) at the end of fiscal 
year t. 
LOGMVt The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (#csho × #p cc_f) at the end of 
fiscal year t. 
MTBt The ratio of the market value of equity (#csho × #p cc_f) to the book value of equity 
(#ceq) at the end of fiscal year t. 
NCSKE t The negative skewness of  over fiscal year t, where  is defined above. 
OPAQUEt The moving sum of the absolute value of abnormal accruals in the prior three years (i.e., 
ABACCt   ABACCt−1   ABACCt−2), where abnormal accruals are estimated using the 
modified Jones model. 
RETt The mean of  over fiscal year t times 100, where  is defined above. 
ROAt The operating income (#o adp) for fiscal year t divided by the book value of total assets 
(#at) at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
SALESVOLt The standard deviation of sales revenue (#sale) scaled by lagged total assets (#at) over 
the five fiscal years from t−4 to t. 
SIGMAt The standard deviation of  over fiscal year t, where  is defined above. 
  
Control variables: Determinants of readability 
AGEt The number of entire years since the firm’s first appearance in Compustat. 
DL t An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the company’s state of incorporation 
is Delaware in fiscal year t and zero otherwise. 
MAt An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is an acquirer in fiscal year t 
according to the Securities Data Company database and zero otherwise. 
NBSEGt The natural logarithm of one plus the number of business segments at the end of fiscal 
year t. 
NGSEGt The natural logarithm of one plus the number of geographic segments at the end of 
fiscal year t. 
NITEMt The number of non-missing items on Compustat for the fiscal year t. 
SEOt An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a seasoned equity 
offering in fiscal year t according to the Securities Data Company database and zero 
otherwise. 
SIt The special items (#sp ) at the end of fiscal year t scaled by the book value of total 
assets (#at) at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
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Figure 1    Time trend of the raw versus modified Fog Index 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the sample medians of (A) RA FOGt and (B) MODFOGt on an annual basis, where RA FOGt is 
the raw Fog Index for the 10-K report filed in year t, calculated as (words per sentence   percentage of complex 
words) × 0.4, and MODFOGt is the modified Fog Index for the 10-K report filed in year t, generated similarly 
except for the definition of complex words. Specifically, we identify a list of 2,028 words that have at least three 
syllables but which are not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify these words as simple 
words. 
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Figure 2    The variable MODFOG for crash versus non-crash firms around the crash year 
 
 
 
Panel A shows the average MODFOG values for crash and non-crash firms from year t−  to year t 1, where t is the 
year the crash occurs. We use propensity scores to match each crash firm with a firm with no crash event through the 
whole sample period, using a matching model that includes all crash determinants and readability determinants. We 
then assign a pseudo crash year to each matched non-crash firm. Panel B depicts the difference in MODFOG 
between the crash firms and matched non-crash firms. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable N Mean Std Q1 Median Q  
NCSKE t 1 52,879 0.024 0.855 −0.453 −0.013 0.437 
DUVOLt 1 52,879 −0.051 0.377 −0.303 −0.063 0.185 
CRASHt 1 52,879 0.225 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MODFOGt 52,879 12.957 1.646 11.867 12.768 13.794 
RA FOGt 52,879 19.693 1.362 18.832 19.592 20.416 
OPAQUEt 52,879 0.369 0.375 0.139 0.251 0.453 
LOGMVt 52,879 5.936 2.002 4.482 5.856 7.235 
MTBt 52,879 2.971 4.256 1.212 2.045 3.551 
LEVt 52,879 0.480 0.246 0.290 0.471 0.634 
ROAt 52,879 0.042 0.209 0.005 0.079 0.143 
DTURNt 52,879 0.004 0.098 −0.028 0.000 0.030 
NCSKE t 52,879 0.022 0.821 −0.446 −0.021 0.417 
SIGMAt 52,879 0.062 0.033 0.037 0.054 0.078 
RETt 52,879 −0.242 0.282 −0.301 −0.142 −0.068 
BETAt 52,879 0.918 0.598 0.466 0.875 1.299 
EARNVOLt 52,879 0.117 0.220 0.027 0.053 0.110 
CFVOLt 52,879 0.112 0.177 0.035 0.061 0.112 
SALESVOLt 52,879 0.338 0.432 0.104 0.200 0.385 
HHIt 52,879 0.153 0.144 0.060 0.101 0.188 
 
Panel B: Univariate comparisons 
  MODFOGt tercile group   
Crash risk measure  (1) Low  (2) Medium  ( ) High  p-value: ( ) − (1) 
NCSKE t 1  0.017  0.020  0.0 4  0.0 4 
DUVOLt 1  −0.04   −0.0 2  −0.0    0.0 8 
CRASHt 1  0.219  0.22   0.2 2  0.002 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics on crash risk, 10-K readability, and the control variables. Our initial sample 
includes all firm–years that file a 10-K report with at least  ,000 words in the period 1994–2014. After combining 
the initial sample with the CRSP and Compustat databases, we require that (i) total assets be greater than zero, 
(ii) the share price at the fiscal year-end be higher than $1, (iii) at least 2  weekly returns be available in the 12-
month period ending three months after the end of fiscal year t 1, and (iv) all financial data used to construct the 
other determinant variables of crash risk be available from the CRSP and Compustat. See the Appendix for the 
definitions of these variables. All the financial and stock return variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. In 
panel B, we sort our sample into three groups by the modified Fog Index (MODFOG), report the average crash risk 
for each group, and test the difference in crash risk between the high- and low-MODFOG groups. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation matrix 
 
 (1) (2) ( ) (4) ( ) ( ) (7) (8) (9) 
NCSKE t 1 (1)  
0.978 0.621 0.002 0.008 0.161 0.101 −0.018 0.110 
DUVOLt 1 (2) 0.957  
0.574 −0.012 −0.009 0.195 0.105 −0.014 0.140 
CRASHt 1 (3) 0.638 0.591  
0.016 0.024 0.077 0.061 −0.013 0.058 
MODFOGt (4) 0.014 −0.003 0.013  
0.105 −0.044 0.083 −0.054 −0.167 
OPAQUEt (5) 0.009 −0.009 0.021 0.080  
−0.177 0.082 −0.113 −0.160 
LOGMVt ( ) 0.143 0.184 0.069 −0.026 −0.122  
0.402 0.129 0.396 
MTBt (7) 0.055 0.052 0.027 0.059 0.096 0.199  
−0.044 0.260 
LEVt (8) −0.022 −0.020 −0.011 −0.007 −0.055 0.105 −0.046  
0.011 
ROAt (9) 0.061 0.103 0.033 −0.171 −0.249 0.302 −0.053 0.022  
DTURNt (10) 0.049 0.048 0.030 0.018 0.013 0.052 0.094 0.026 0.024 
NCSKE t (11) 0.043 0.043 0.032 0.004 −0.007 0.116 −0.008 −0.021 0.055 
SIGMAt (12) −0.041 −0.099 −0.033 0.131 0.258 −0.491 0.032 −0.033 −0.419 
RETt (13) 0.044 0.096 0.036 −0.109 −0.243 0.410 −0.043 0.008 0.405 
BETAt (14) 0.081 0.078 0.047 0.039 0.106 0.361 0.100 −0.045 −0.040 
EARNVOLt (15) 0.005 −0.026 0.006 0.119 0.404 −0.152 0.136 −0.132 −0.429 
CFVOLt (16) 0.003 −0.029 0.006 0.127 0.408 −0.182 0.141 −0.119 −0.420 
SALESVOLt (17) 0.010 −0.011 0.002 0.042 0.272 −0.184 0.028 −0.052 −0.029 
HHIt (18) −0.003 0.008 0.000 −0.099 −0.146 0.032 −0.063 0.095 0.149 
 
 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
NCSKE t 1 (1) 0.057 0.045 −0.046 0.046 0.084 −0.005 −0.005 0.012 −0.003 
DUVOLt 1 (2) 0.056 0.046 −0.098 0.099 0.083 −0.039 −0.038 −0.009 0.010 
CRASHt 1 (3) 0.033 0.026 −0.027 0.027 0.054 0.008 0.009 0.009 −0.009 
MODFOGt (4) 0.005 −0.005 0.163 −0.163 0.058 0.178 0.171 0.032 −0.174 
OPAQUEt (5) −0.009 −0.008 0.295 −0.295 0.106 0.372 0.407 0.256 −0.231 
LOGMVt ( ) 0.098 0.134 −0.539 0.541 0.423 −0.307 −0.341 −0.253 0.026 
MTBt (7) 0.135 0.005 −0.104 0.104 0.198 0.124 0.102 −0.010 −0.130 
LEVt (8) 0.049 −0.016 −0.095 0.095 −0.054 −0.277 −0.244 −0.064 0.175 
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ROAt (9) 0.111 0.070 −0.399 0.400 −0.013 −0.283 −0.250 −0.027 0.181 
DTURNt (10)  0.021 0.098 −0.097 0.021 −0.050 −0.032 −0.046 0.006 
NCSKE t (11) 0.016  −0.014 0.027 0.101 −0.013 −0.020 0.005 0.000 
SIGMAt (12) 0.169 0.004  −1.000 0.030 0.540 0.509 0.349 −0.185 
RETt (13) −0.185 0.037 −0.958  
−0.028 −0.540 −0.509 −0.349 0.185 
BETAt (14) 0.029 0.093 0.061 −0.049  
0.117 0.051 0.016 −0.123 
EARNVOLt (15) 0.013 −0.008 0.367 −0.349 0.108  
0.742 0.517 −0.259 
CFVOLt (16) 0.022 −0.013 0.367 −0.346 0.070 0.881  
0.496 −0.217 
SALESVOLt (17) −0.019 0.003 0.292 −0.258 0.029 0.403 0.409  
0.004 
HHIt (18) −0.004 −0.001 −0.144 0.122 −0.087 −0.130 −0.125 −0.036  
This table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations between crash risk, 10-K readability, and other determinants of crash risk below and above the diagonal, 
respectively. See the Appendix for the variable definitions. Boldface represents the significance level of 0.0 . 
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TABLE 3 
Impact of 10-K readability on stock price crash risk 
 Dependent variable = 
 NCSKE t 1 DUVOLt 1 CRASHt 1 
    
MODFOGt 0.008
***
 0.003
***
 0.018
***
 
 (3.67) (2.86) (2.65) 
OPAQUEt 0.069
**
 0.031
**
 0.041 
 (2.36) (2.48) (0.52) 
OPAQUEt
2
 −0.038** −0.016** −0.024 
 (−2.51) (−2.46) (−0.60) 
LOGMVt 0.059
***
 0.029
***
 0.064
***
 
 (19.82) (21.88) (7.40) 
MTBt 0.003
***
 0.001
***
 0.001 
 (2.68) (2.59) (0.33) 
LEVt −0.084
***
 −0.046*** 0.046 
 (−4.66) (−5.86) (0.93) 
ROAt 0.212
***
 0.124
***
 0.532
***
 
 (8.45) (11.55) (7.60) 
DTURNt 0.295
***
 0.145
***
 0.640
***
 
 (7.34) (8.37) (5.67) 
NCSKE t 0.013
**
 0.005
**
 0.037
***
 
 (2.56) (2.38) (2.74) 
SIGMAt 4.239
***
 1.182
***
 8.166
***
 
 (8.46) (5.43) (5.39) 
RETt 0.447
***
 0.164
***
 1.016
***
 
 (8.72) (7.41) (6.22) 
BETAt 0.030
***
 0.009
**
 0.016 
 (3.75) (2.57) (0.67) 
EARNVOLt 0.035 0.009 0.074 
 (0.90) (0.55) (0.72) 
CFVOLt 0.046 0.018 0.132 
 (0.94) (0.83) (1.06) 
SALESVOLt 0.025
**
 0.009
*
 0.025 
 (2.35) (1.84) (0.82) 
HHIt 0.014 −0.002 0.091 
 (0.39) (−0.11) (0.93) 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,879 52,879 52,879 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
 0.040 0.054 0.021 
This table presents the results for the OLS regressions of NCSKE t 1 and DUVOLt 1 and the logistic regression of 
CRASHt 1 on our readability measure MODFOGt. The variable NCSKE t 1 is the negative skewness of   over 
fiscal year t 1; DUVOLt 1 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of   on down weeks to the 
standard deviation of   on up weeks, where the down and up weeks are, respectively, those with   below and 
above the mean over fiscal year t 1, respectively; CRASHt 1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at 
least one value of   over the fiscal year t 1 falls 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean   for the fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise; and   is the firm-specific weekly return, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
residual return from estimating an expanded index model including lead and lag terms for the market and industry 
indexes. We define a fiscal year as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-
ahead bias. The variable MODFOGt is the modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year 
t. The Fog Index is calculated as (words per sentence   percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture readability 
in the financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables but which are 
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not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating MODFOG. See 
the Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. All the models also include an unreported intercept. The t- 
and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.0 , and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Cross-sectional analysis: Effect of current earnings performance and earnings persistence 
Panel A: Poor versus good current earnings performance 
  NCSKE t 1  DUVOLt 1  CRASHt 1 
  Poor current 
performance 
Good current 
performance 
 Poor current 
performance 
Good current 
performance 
 Poor current 
performance 
Good current 
performance 
          
MODFOGt  0.011
***
 0.006
*
  0.005
***
 0.001  0.018
*
 0.019
*
 
  (3.39) (1.77)  (3.19) (0.83)  (1.88) (1.93) 
          
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  26,565 26,295  26,565 26,295  26,565 26,295 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
  0.041 0.038  0.057 0.050  0.022 0.023 
          
Subsample difference:          
MODFOGt  χ
2
 = 1.25 (p   0.2 4)  χ2 = 2.66 (p   0.10 )  χ2 = 0.00 (p   0.9  ) 
          
Panel B: Current earnings performance and earnings persistence 
  NCSKE t 1  DUVOLt 1  CRASHt 1 
 
 Poor current 
performance 
Good current 
performance 
 Poor current 
performance 
Good current 
performance 
 Poor current 
performance 
Good current 
performance 
          
MODFOG_PERSISTENTt (1) 0.015
***
 −0.001  0.006*** −0.002  0.025*** −0.003 
  (4.57) (−0.37)  (4.41) (−1.21)  (2.58) (−0.29) 
MODFOG_TRANSITORYt (2) 0.005 0.009
***
  0.002 0.003
*
  0.003 0.026
***
 
  (1.45) (2.79)  (1.21) (1.80)  (0.26) (2.60) 
          
Testing (1) = (2)  p < 0.001 p < 0.001  p < 0.001 p < 0.001  p < 0.001 p < 0.001 
          
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  26,516 26,251  26,516 26,251  26,516 26,251 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
  0.047 0.044  0.063 0.055  0.026 0.028 
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Panel A presents the results for the subsample OLS regressions of NCSKE t 1 and DUVOLt 1 and the logistic regressions of CRASHt 1 on our readability 
measure MODFOGt. We partition our sample by current performance, where good (poor) current performance means ΔROAt ! 0 (ΔROAt < 0). Panel B reports 
the results when the firm–years are further divided by earnings persistence. The variable MODFOG_PERSISTENTt (MODFOG_TRANSITORYt) equals 
MODFOGt if ΔROAt 1 and ΔROAt have the same (opposite) sign and zero otherwise; NCSKE t 1 is the negative skewness of   over fiscal year t 1; DUVOLt 1 
is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of   on down weeks to the standard deviation of   on up weeks, where the down and up weeks are, 
respectively, those with   below and above the mean over fiscal year t 1; CRASHt 1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the 
values of   over the fiscal year t 1 falls 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean   for the fiscal year and zero otherwise; and   is the firm-specific 
weekly return, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from estimating an expanded index model including lead and lag terms for the 
market and industry indexes. We define the fiscal year as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-ahead bias. The 
variable MODFOGt is the modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is calculated as (words per sentence   
percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture readability in the financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables 
but which are not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating MODFOG. All the models include the 
determinants of crash risk as control variables, although the coefficients are not reported for brevity. See the Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. 
All the models also include an unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. * and *** 
represent significance levels of 0.10 and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Cross-sectional analysis: CEO stock options holding and litigation risk 
Panel A: CEO stock options 
  NCSKE t 1  DUVOLt 1  CRASHt 1 
  High Low  High Low  High Low 
          
MODFOGt  0.014
***
 0.002  0.006
***
 −0.000  0.038*** 0.011 
  (3.04) (0.52)  (2.77) (−0.20)  (2.89) (0.75) 
          
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  11,543 11,543  11,543 11,543  11,543 11,543 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
  0.025 0.025  0.026 0.033  0.026 0.023 
          
Subsample difference:          
MODFOGt  χ
2
 = 3.26 (p   0.071)  χ2 = 4.27 (p   0.0 9)  χ2 = 1.97 (p   0.1 1) 
 
Panel B: Litigation risk 
  NCSKE t 1  DUVOLt 1  CRASHt 1 
  High Low  High Low  High Low 
          
MODFOGt  0.004 0.012
***
  0.001 0.005
***
  0.015 0.024
**
 
  (1.25) (3.81)  (0.67) (3.30)  (1.50) (2.40) 
          
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  25,359 25,358  25,359 25,358  25,359 25,358 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
  0.037 0.038  0.054 0.051  0.021 0.023 
          
Subsample difference:          
MODFOGt  χ
2
 = 2.84 (p   0.092)  χ2 = 3.06 (p   0.080)  χ2 = 0.40 (p   0. 28) 
This table presents the results for the subsample OLS regressions of NCSKE t 1 and DUVOLt 1 and the logistic regressions of CRASHt 1 on our readability 
measure MODFOGt. In panel A, we assign a firm–year observation to the high (low) options holding subsample if the CEO exercisable in-the-money options 
holding scaled by total compensation is greater (smaller) than the sample median. In panel B, we assign a firm–year observation to the high (low) litigation risk 
subsample if the Kim–Skinner (2012) measure of litigation risk is greater (smaller) than the sample median. The variable NCSKE t 1 is the negative skewness of 
  over fiscal year t 1; DUVOLt 1 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of   on down weeks to the standard deviation of   on up weeks, 
where the down and up weeks are, respectively, those with   below and above the mean over fiscal year t 1; CRASHt 1 is an indicator variable that takes the 
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value of one if at least one of the values of   over the fiscal year t 1 falls 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean   for the fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise; and   is the firm-specific weekly return, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from estimating an expanded index model 
including lead and lag terms for the market and industry indexes. We define the fiscal year as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end 
to avoid look-ahead bias. The variable MODFOGt is the modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is calculated 
as (words per sentence   percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture readability in the financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words 
that exceed three syllables but which are not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating MODFOG. See the 
Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. All the models also include an unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered by firm. ** and *** represent significance levels of 0.0  and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Impact of 10-K readability on the association between earnings manipulation and stock price crash risk 
Panel A: Full sample (N    2,879) 
  NCSKE t 1  DUVOLt 1  CRASHt 1 
  High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
 High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
 High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
          
OPAQUEt  0.127
***
 0.006  0.058
***
 0.002  0.216
**
 −0.149 
  (3.16) (0.14)  (3.32) (0.09)  (2.00) (−1.25) 
OPAQUEt
2
  −0.066*** −0.005  −0.029*** 0.000  −0.102* 0.071 
  (−3.28) (−0.19)  (−3.37) (0.03)  (−1.95) (1.12) 
          
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  27,690 25,189  27,690 25,189  27,690 25,189 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
  0.039 0.041  0.054 0.055  0.022 0.023 
          
Subsample difference:          
OPAQUEt  χ
2
 = 4.23 (p   0.040)  χ2 = 4.96 (p   0.02 )  χ2 = 5.12 (p   0.024) 
OPAQUEt
2
  χ2 = 3.82 (p   0.0 1)  χ2 = 4.85 (p   0.028)  χ2 = 4.40 (p   0.0  ) 
 
Panel B: Pre-SOX period (N   18,848) 
  NCSKE t 1  DUVOLt 1  CRASHt 1 
  High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
 High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
 High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
          
OPAQUEt  0.139
**
 0.151
**
  0.064
**
 0.055
*
  0.131 0.178 
  (2.12) (2.12)  (2.22) (1.69)  (0.60) (0.73) 
OPAQUEt
2
  −0.090*** −0.078**  −0.044*** −0.029*  −0.071 −0.036 
  (−2.70) (−2.23)  (−3.03) (−1.72)  (−0.66) (−0.28) 
          
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  9,876 8,972  9,876 8,972  9,876 8,948 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
  0.064 0.066  0.081 0.081  0.024 0.025 
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Subsample difference:          
OPAQUEt  χ
2
 = 0.01 (p   0.907)  χ2 = 0.04 (p   0.8 2)  χ2 = 0.02 (p   0.88 ) 
OPAQUEt
2
  χ2 = 0.06 (p   0.80 )  χ2 = 0.47 (p   0.49 )  χ2 = 0.04 (p   0.8 7) 
 
Panel C: Post-SOX period (N    4,0 1) 
  NCSKE t 1  DUVOLt 1  CRASHt 1 
  High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
 High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
 High 
MODFOGt 
Low 
MODFOGt 
          
OPAQUEt  0.115
**
 −0.033  0.052** −0.009  0.252** −0.234* 
  (2.33) (−0.61)  (2.43) (−0.41)  (1.99) (−1.68) 
OPAQUEt
2
  −0.057** 0.015  −0.025** 0.006  −0.118* 0.101 
  (−2.31) (0.53)  (−2.31) (0.47)  (−1.93) (1.39) 
          
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  17,814 16,217  17,814 16,217  17,814 16,217 
Adjusted/pseudo-R
2
  0.030 0.027  0.039 0.037  0.018 0.017 
          
Subsample difference:          
OPAQUEt  χ
2
 = 4.04 (p   0.044)  χ2 = 3.85 (p   0.0 0)  χ2 = 6.57 (p   0.010) 
OPAQUEt
2
  χ2 = 3.51 (p   0.0 1)  χ2 = 3.44 (p   0.0 4)  χ2 = 5.29 (p   0.021) 
This table presents the results for the subsample OLS regressions of NCSKE t 1 and DUVOLt 1 and the logistic regressions of CRASHt 1 on the measure of 
opacity of Hutton et al. (2009), OPAQUEt. Panels A to C report the results for the full sample, the pre-SOX period (i.e., 1994–2001), and the post-SOX period 
(i.e., 2002–2014), respectively. We assign a firm–year observation to the high (low) disclosure complexity subsample if the MODFOGt is greater (smaller) than 
the industry–year median. The variable NCSKE t 1 is the negative skewness of   over fiscal year t 1; DUVOLt 1 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
standard deviation of   on down weeks to the standard deviation of   on up weeks, where the down and up weeks are, respectively, those with   below and 
above the mean over fiscal year t 1; CRASHt 1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the values of   over the fiscal year t 1 falls 
3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean   for the fiscal year and zero otherwise; and   is the firm-specific weekly return, defined as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the residual return from estimating an expanded index model including lead and lag terms for the market and industry indexes. We define 
the fiscal year as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-ahead bias. The variable MODFOGt is the modified version of 
the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is calculated as (words per sentence   percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture 
readability in the financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables but which are not difficult to understand in the 
financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating MODFOG. The variable OPAQUEt is the moving sum of the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals in the prior three years (i.e., ABACCt   ABACCt−1   ABACCt−2), where abnormal accruals are estimated using the modified Jones model. All the models 
include the determinants of crash risk as control variables, although the coefficients are not reported for brevity. See the Appendix for the definitions of the 
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control variables. All the models also include an unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.0 , and 0.01, respectively. 
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This online appendix provides supporting information to accompany the paper 
“Readability of 10-K Reports and Stock Price Crash Risk.” The contents are as follows: 
Online Appendix A introduces the procedure of parsing 10-K filings. 
Online Appendix B presents the word list. 
Online Appendix C presents the validity test of the modified Fog Index 
Online Appendix D reports the results of the robustness checks discussed in Section 5. 
Online Appendix E introduces an alternative method of modifying the Fog Index.   
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Online Appendix A. Parsing 10-K filings 
We download all 10-K and 10-K405 documents from the SEC online EDGAR system and 
generally follow the procedure specified by Li (2008) to edit these documents.1,2 First, we 
delete the heading information that begins with <SEC-HEADER> or <IMS-HEADER> and 
ends with </SEC-HEADER> or </IMS-HEADER>. Second, for each part of the text between 
<DOCUMENT> and </DOCUMENT>, we check whether the part’s <TYPE> tag is followed by 
text beginning with 10 or EX and whether its <FILENAME> tag is followed by text ending 
with .txt or .htm. If these two criteria are not both satisfied, part of text is purged, because it 
is an embedded graphic, an electronic form, or some other type of file that unduly increases 
the file size and confuses the language processing program.3 Third, we translate encoded 
characters starting with &, such as &nbsp (blank), &amp (&), and &#8211 (en dash), back to 
their original form. Fourth, we delete tables that are contained between <TABLE> and 
</TABLE> if more than 25 percent of the non-blank characters are numbers.4 Paragraphs 
that contain <S> or <C> are also deleted, because some firms use these tags to present 
tables, especially in the early years of our sample period. Fifth, all HTML tags in the <…> 
format are replaced with blanks. Finally, we delete all paragraphs with more than 50 
percent non-alphabetic (i.e., numeric or blank space) characters to ensure that tables such 
as financial statements and schedules are excluded from our analysis. 
  
                                                          
1 We thank Andrew Leone for making his web-crawling program publicly available on his personal website. 
2 See Appendix A of Li (2008) for the author’s parsing procedure. We thank Feng Li for providing us with 
more details about the procedure. 
3 Unlike Loughran and McDonald (2011), we do not drop all 10-K exhibits. Some 10-K filers use template 
language in the main part while referring to exhibits (or, more specifically, Exhibit 13) for their annual 
reports. Therefore, deleting all exhibits could unduly reduce useful textual content. We agree with Loughran 
and McDonald to the extent that some exhibits (e.g., Exhibit 31.1 in the post-SOX period) are more likely to 
contain template language, but we believe this creates no systematic bias in our estimate of readability 
indices. Therefore, our approach to handling 10-K exhibits should not affect the inferences in this paper. 
4 This step differs from the method used by Li (2008), who deletes all tables, regardless of their content. Some 
10-K filers tabulate all of their text. Therefore, deleting all tables could inappropriately drop useful textual 
information. It is worth noting that Loughran and McDonald (2011) raise the same issue in their Internet 
Appendix. We thus follow them in choosing 25 percent as the cutoff point. 
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Online Appendix B. Word list 
In Table B.1, we list all the complex words collected from the Compustat variable lists and 
the Fama–French 49-industry description file. To save space, we do not include inflections, 
but the full list of complex words (including inflections) is available upon request.5 
 
  
                                                          
5 We use an example to illustrate how we account for inflections. The original word list (excluding inflections) 
includes the terms consolidated and consolidation. We include word inflections such as consolidate, 
consolidates, consolidating, and consolidations. 
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TABLE B.1 
Word list (excluding inflections) 
abandonments consolidation gaming-related nonferrous relationship 
abrasive constituent gasoline non-ferrous remainder 
absorptions construction general non-financial remuneration 
accelerated consulting generation noninsurance repayments 
acceptance consumed generations noninterest replacement 
acceptances consumer geographic non-interest reported 
accessories containers geographical non-metalic reporting 
accident contingencies government non-metallic reproduction 
accounting contingency governments nonoperating repurchase 
accumulated contingent groceries non-operating repurchased 
acquired continuing grocery non-ordinary requested 
acquisition contractors guaranteed nonperforming requirement 
acquisitions contribute guarantees nonqualified requirements 
activities contribution headquarters nonrecurring reserves 
additional contributions historical non-recurring residential 
additions controlling history nonredeemable residual 
adjusted convenience holiday non-redeemable residuals 
adjustment conversion homebuilding non-residential resources 
adjustments converted homeowners nontaxable restatement 
administrative convertible homesites nonutility restaurants 
admission corporate hospitals nonwoven restricted 
admissions corporations household normalized restructured 
adoption cosmetics households novelty restructuring 
advancements covering hydraulic numeric retailers 
advances credited identifiable nurseries retained 
advertising creditors identification obligation retainer 
affiliates cumulative identifier obligations retirement 
aftertax currency identifiers observable retirements 
after-tax custody impairment observations retrieval 
agencies customer impairments occupancy reupholster 
aggregate customers improvements offering revaluation 
aggregates database inactivation officer revenue 
agreements debentures inactive officers revenues 
agricultural decimals incentive offices reversal 
agriculture decision incidental opened revision 
allocated declaration including operating risk-adjusted 
allocation declared incorporation operation salaries 
allowance deductions indebtedness operations salary 
allowances deferral indexes operative sanitary 
allowed deferred indicated operator secondary 
aluminum definition indicates operators secured 
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amendment deleted indicator ophthalmic securities 
american deletion indicators opinion security 
amortization delivered individual optical segregated 
amusement deliveries individuals optional semiannual 
analytical department industrial option-related semi-annual 
animals depletion industries ordinary separate 
annually deposit industry organic sequencial 
annuity deposited ineffective organizations services 
anthracite depository inflation ornamental servicing 
anticipated deposits informat outpatient settlement 
apartment deprecated information outstanding settlements 
apparatus depreciation initial overdrafts severity 
apparel derivative inorganical overlaps shareholders 
appliances derivatives insider ownership shipbuilding 
applicable describing inspection paperboard signaling 
application description institution parenthesis silverware 
applications descriptor institutional participant simulators 
appropriations destination institutions participation situation 
architect detection instruments partnerships specialty 
architectural detective insurance passenger standardized 
articles detergents insured passengers statement 
asbestos developed intangible penalties stationery 
assessment developers intangibles percentage statutory 
associated development integrated percentile stockholders 
assumed devices interactive performance structural 
assumption diagnostics intercity perfumes subdivisions 
auditing different interconnect periodic sub-industries 
auditor diluted interconnections periodicals subindustry 
auditors dilution interdepartmental periodicity subordinated 
australian director interest peripherals subscription 
authorities directors interim permanent subsidiaries 
authorized directory interlocks personal subsidiary 
automatic disallowances internal personnel subsurface 
automation discontinued international petrochemicals summarized 
automobile dispensing intersegment petroleum summary 
automobiles disposal in-the-money pharmaceutical supplementary 
automotive disposals inventories phonographic surety 
availability distillates inventory photofinishing surgeries 
available distilled invested photographic surgery 
average distributable investing physical surrenders 
awarded distribution investment pipelines syndicates 
bakeries distributions investments plan-based synthetic 
bakery dividend investors policy tangible 
 S5 
 
balances dividends involuntary policyholders taxable 
batteries document irrigation political taxation 
beginning domestic issuance pollution taxicabs 
beneficial drycleaning japanese population tax-regulated 
benefit duplicate jewelers porcelain telecommunications 
benefits durable jewelry position telegraph 
beverage duration jurisdiction positions telephone 
beverages earthenware justification postretirement terminal 
bicycles economic kilometers potato terminals 
biological educational launderers pottery termination 
bituminous effective liabilities preacquisition terminations 
black-scholes electric liability preference territory 
bonuses electrical liberalized preferred textiles 
bookkeeping electromedical library preliminary thereafter 
book-to-bill electronic licensed premises timestamp 
borrowed element limitations preparations tobacco 
borrowings elevators limited prepared totalizing 
botanic eliminations liquefied prepayments transaction 
break-even emoluments liquidating presentation transactions 
broadcasters employment liquidation preserved transition 
brokerage enabled litigation primary translation 
business encryption livestock principal transmission 
calculate energy logical procedures transparency 
calculation engineering long-lived processing transportation 
calendar engines machinery produced transported 
camera engraving machines producer treasury 
canada enrollment magnetic production turbines 
canadian entertainers maintenance professional turnover 
cancelled entertainment managed programming ultimate 
capability equipment management promotional unadjusted 
capacity equity managers properties unamortized 
capital equivalent mandatory property unappropriated 
capitalized equivalents manifold proposed unbilled 
case-sensitive estimate manufactured proprietary unconsolidated 
casino estimated marginal protection underfunded 
casualty evaluation marketable protective underground 
catalog excluded marketing provision underlying 
category excluding material provisions undertakings 
certificate executed materials publishing underwriting 
certificates executive maximum purchased undeveloped 
certification exercisable measurement purchases undivided 
certified exercise measuring purchasing unearned 
character exercised medicaid quality unemployment 
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charge-offs existing medical quarterly unexercisable 
chemicals expected medicare quotation unexercised 
classification expenditures medicinal realized unfunded 
classified expenses membership receivable unlisted 
closed-end expiration merchandise receivables unobservable 
cogeneration exploration metalworking received unrealized 
collating external mineral recipient unrecognized 
collection extinguishment minerals reclaimed unrestricted 
combination extraction minimum recognized unsecured 
combined extraordinary minority recording untaxed 
combustion fabricated miscellaneous recoveries unusual 
commercial face-amount missiles recreation unutilized 
commissions facilities mnemonic recreational unvested 
commitment fasteners modified redeemable upholstery 
commitments federal mortgages redeemed utilities 
committee ferroalloy motorcycle redemption utility 
commodity filename motorcycles reduction utilized 
communication financial movements reductions validated 
communications financing musical reference valuation 
communities finished national referred variable 
companies finishing natural referring variety 
company fiscal-year navigation refined vegetable 
comparability fixtures needlework refineries vegetables 
comparable flavoring newsdealers refining vehicles 
compensating flowed-through newspapers refrigerating vehicular 
compensation forecast nominal refrigerator vitreous 
components forestry nonaccrual registrant volatility 
comprehensive forwarding nonadmitted regulated wallpaper 
compression frequency nonconsolidated regulatory warehousing 
compustat fundamental noncontrolling reinsurance wholesale 
computer fundamentals non-current reinsurers withdrawals 
computers funeral nondepository reinvested writedowns 
conditioner furnaces nondistributable rejoined year-to-date 
conditioning furnishings nondurable related  
confectionery furniture non-earning relates 
 consolidated galleries non-equity relations 
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Online Appendix C. Validity of the modified Fog Index 
In this appendix, we test the validity of our modified Fog Index by examining whether it 
alleviates the problems raised by Loughran and McDonald (2014). These authors argue 
that traditional readability measures (e.g., the Fog Index) are substantially misspecified in 
the context of financial disclosures and thus fragile in explaining uncertainty in the 
information environment attributable to textual complexity. Specifically, they find that the 
Fog Index is no longer associated with the information environment after controlling for 
10-K file size and they further argue that file size is a simpler but better measure of the 
readability of 10-Ks compared to the Fog Index and its two components (i.e., number of 
words per sentence and the percentage of complex words). To show the validity of our 
modified indices, we start with replicating their main results and then replace the Fog 
Index with our modified Fog Index. If our modification procedure successfully addresses 
the problems associated with the Fog Index, we expect the result of the modified Fog Index 
to be robust, even after controlling for the file size of 10-K documents. 
We estimate the following OLS model that links 10-K readability metrics to the 
information environment proxy: 
 
RETVOL = β0 + β1 FOG + β2 FILESIZE + γ Control_Variables + ε,                                       (C.1) 
 
where RETVOL is the post-filing date return volatility measured by the root mean squared 
error from the Fama–French three-factor model estimated for days [6, 28] following the 
10-K filing; FOG is either RAWFOG or MODFOG, as defined in the Appendix, calculated from 
the 10-K reports; and FILESIZE is the natural log of the 10-K file size in megabytes. The set 
of control variables includes ALPHA, the alpha from the three-factor model estimated using 
days [−252, −6] relative to the 10-K filing date; RMSE, the root mean squared error from 
the three-factor model estimated using days [−252, −6] relative to the 10-K filing date; 
ABRET, the absolute value of the filing period excess return measured by the buy-and-hold 
return over the two-day period [0, +1] relative to the 10-K filing date minus the buy-and-
hold value-weighted market return over the same period; LOGMV, the market value of 
equity (in billions of US dollars) on the 10-K filing date; BTM, the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the 10-K 
filing date; and NASDAQ, an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is listed 
on NASDAQ at the time of the 10-K filing and zero otherwise. For expositional ease, RETVOL, 
ALPHA, and RMSE are multiplied by 100. 
We start our sample selection with all 10-K and 10-K405 documents available on 
EDGAR during 1994–2011 and follow the parsing procedure described in Online Appendix 
A. We require a minimum of 10 return observations available from the CRSP for days [6, 28] 
following the 10-K filing to estimate RETVOL and a minimum of 60 return observations for 
days [−252, −6] to estimate ALPHA and RMSE. We further delete the firm-filing date 
observations with missing or negative book values of equity for the most recent fiscal year-
end available from Compustat. We are left with a final sample of 63,430 observations that 
satisfy the above criteria and have complete data to calculate all the control variables. In all 
regressions in this appendix, the variable BTM is winsorized at the top and bottom 1 
percent of our observations. 
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Table C.1 shows the results of our validity tests. Column (1) replicates column (2) of 
Table III of Loughran and McDonald (2014), while columns (3) and (4) replicate, 
respectively, columns (1) and (2) of their Table VI. Consistent with these authors’ results, 
we find that both RAWFOG and FILESIZE have significantly positive loadings on post-filing 
date return volatility when they are separately included in the model. When these two 
readability measures are included in the model together, FILESIZE subsumes RAWFOG in 
explaining variation in the dependent variable. This finding supports Loughran and 
McDonald’s (2014) argument that FILESIZE (against RAWFOG) is a simple yet better 
readability proxy. It is worth noting that the magnitude and significance level of all the 
explanatory variables in our tests are also comparable to theirs. In column (2) of Table C.1, 
we replace RAWFOG with MODFOG and estimate the same regression model as in column 
(1). We find that the magnitude and the t-statistic of the coefficient of MODFOG are both 
larger than for RAWFOG. More importantly, the coefficient of MODFOG remains significant 
at the 5 percent level, even after we control for FILESIZE in column (5).6 This provides 
evidence that we are at least partly successful in addressing the concerns raised by 
Loughran and McDonald (2014), insofar as FILESIZE cannot subsume MODFOG in 
explaining the information environment. Our result demonstrates that MODFOG has 
incremental explanatory power for the overall quality of the information environment and 
therefore can be used by future research on the textual analysis of corporate disclosures. 
 
  
                                                          
6 Alternatively, we measure post-filing date return volatility by the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
relative to the value-weighted CRSP index over days [6, 28] relative to the 10-K file date. The results are 
similar. 
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TABLE C.1 
Testing the validity of the modified Fog Index 
 Dependent variable = RETVOL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
RAWFOG 0.016***   0.007  
 (2.83)   (1.27)  
MODFOG  0.025***   0.015** 
  (4.10)   (2.55) 
FILESIZE   0.083*** 0.079*** 0.068*** 
   (4.50) (4.26) (3.72) 
ALPHA −0.874*** −0.867*** −0.858*** −0.857*** −0.855*** 
 (−6.34) (−6.32) (−6.33) (−6.34) (−6.33) 
RMSE 0.542*** 0.540*** 0.538*** 0.538*** 0.537*** 
 (12.33) (12.30) (12.06) (12.08) (12.10) 
ABRET 4.860*** 4.851*** 4.848*** 4.847*** 4.843*** 
 (15.99) (15.95) (16.04) (16.05) (16.01) 
LOGMV −0.115*** −0.116*** −0.129*** −0.128*** −0.127*** 
 (−5.63) (−5.70) (−5.82) (−5.79) (−5.75) 
BTM −0.173*** −0.172*** −0.181*** −0.181*** −0.179*** 
 (−3.21) (−3.19) (−3.33) (−3.32) (−3.31) 
NASDAQ 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.236*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 
 (3.10) (3.10) (3.11) (3.12) (3.12) 
      
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 63,430 63,430 63,430 63,430 63,430 
Adj. R2 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.453 
This table reports the results of testing the validity of our readability measure MODFOG. The dependent 
variable is RETVOL, measured by the root mean squared error from the Fama–French three-factor model 
estimated for days [6, 28] following the 10-K filing date. The variable RAWFOG is the Fog Index calculated as 
(words per sentence + percentage of complex words) × 0.4 and MODFOG is our modified version of the Fog 
Index. To capture readability in the financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that 
exceed three syllables but which are not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as 
simple words in calculating MODFOG. The variable FILESIZE is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 10-K 
file size in megabytes; ALPHA and RMSE are the alpha and root mean squared error, respectively, from the 
three-factor model estimated using days [−252, −6] relative to the 10-K filing date; LOGMV is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity (in billions of US dollars) on the 10-K filing date; BTM is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the most recent fiscal year-end 
prior to the 10-K filing date; NASDAQ is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is listed on 
NASDAQ at the time of the 10-K filing and zero otherwise; and ABRET is the absolute value of filing period 
excess return measured by the buy-and-hold return over the two-day period [0,+1] relative to the 10-K filing 
date minus the buy-and-hold value-weighted market return over the same period. All the models include an 
intercept, calendar year dummies, and Fama–French 48-industry dummies. The t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by industry and year. ** and *** represent significance 
levels of 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
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Online Appendix D. Robustness checks 
 
TABLE D.1 
Controlling for determinants of 10-K readability 
 Dependent variable = 
 NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 CRASHt+1 
    
MODFOGt 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.024*** 
 (3.97) (3.15) (3.14) 
OPAQUEt 0.085*** 0.039*** 0.088 
 (2.69) (2.79) (0.98) 
OPAQUEt2 −0.045*** −0.019*** −0.037 
 (−2.77) (−2.64) (−0.80) 
LOGMVt 0.058*** 0.028*** 0.060*** 
 (15.75) (17.13) (5.64) 
MTBt 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002 
 (2.84) (2.65) (0.77) 
LEVt −0.063*** −0.036*** 0.153*** 
 (−3.02) (−3.98) (2.63) 
ROAt 0.283*** 0.156*** 0.696*** 
 (10.01) (12.82) (8.11) 
DTURNt 0.215*** 0.111*** 0.551*** 
 (4.75) (5.67) (4.16) 
NCSKEWt 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.045*** 
 (2.86) (2.75) (2.90) 
SIGMAt 3.289*** 0.758*** 5.939*** 
 (5.82) (3.08) (3.38) 
RETt 0.365*** 0.127*** 0.805*** 
 (6.34) (5.09) (4.25) 
BETAt 0.029*** 0.009** 0.006 
 (3.22) (2.36) (0.25) 
EARNVOLt −0.010 −0.012 −0.013 
 (−0.22) (−0.59) (−0.10) 
CFVOLt 0.067 0.026 0.138 
 (1.25) (1.07) (0.88) 
SALESVOLt 0.024** 0.007 0.003 
 (2.02) (1.45) (0.08) 
HHIt 0.021 −0.003 0.130 
 (0.56) (−0.19) (1.25) 
AGEt −0.002*** −0.001*** −0.003*** 
 (−4.77) (−4.52) (−3.04) 
SIt 0.041 0.050 0.084 
 (0.52) (1.41) (0.35) 
NBSEGt −0.031*** −0.015*** −0.023 
 (−2.70) (−2.97) (−0.67) 
NGSEGt −0.003 −0.001 0.010 
 (−0.24) (−0.26) (0.32) 
NITEMt 0.001** 0.000** 0.002 
 (2.49) (2.41) (1.39) 
SEOt 0.119*** 0.055*** 0.158*** 
 (7.02) (7.49) (3.47) 
MAt 0.015* 0.007* 0.064** 
 (1.73) (1.87) (2.46) 
DLWt −0.002 −0.002 −0.017 
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 (−0.22) (−0.41) (−0.64) 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 42,473 42,473 42,473 
Adjusted/pseudo-R2 0.046 0.061 0.023 
This table presents the results for the OLS regressions of NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1 and the logistic regression 
of CRASHt+1 on our readability measure MODFOGt, controlling for a battery of determinants of readability. The 
variable NCSKEWt+1 is the negative skewness of W over fiscal year t+1; DUVOLt+1 is the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of the standard deviation of W on down weeks to the standard deviation of W on up weeks, where the 
down and up weeks are, respectively, those with W below and above the mean over fiscal year t+1; CRASHt+1 is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the values of W over the fiscal year t+1 falls 
3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean W for the fiscal year and zero otherwise; and W is the firm-
specific weekly return, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from estimating an 
expanded index model including lead and lag terms for the market and industry indexes. We define a fiscal 
year as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-ahead bias. The 
variable MODFOGt is the modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog 
Index is calculated as (words per sentence + percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture readability in the 
financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables but which are 
not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating 
MODFOG. See the Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. All the models also include an 
unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered 
by firm. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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Table D.2 
Falsification test 
 Dependent variable = 
 Pred_NCSKEWt+1 Pred_DUVOLt+1 Pred_CRASHt+1 
    
MODFOGt 0.0000 −0.0002 −0.0001 
 (0.06) (−1.17) (−0.69) 
OPAQUEt −0.0073* −0.0058*** −0.0037*** 
 (−1.94) (−3.19) (−3.62) 
OPAQUEt2 0.0023 0.0017* 0.0012** 
 (1.28) (1.93) (2.39) 
LOGMVt 0.0171*** 0.0091*** 0.0044*** 
 (32.47) (36.50) (32.85) 
MTBt −0.0008*** −0.0005*** −0.0002*** 
 (−6.25) (−8.27) (−7.51) 
LEVt −0.0062** −0.0014 −0.0015** 
 (−2.21) (−1.03) (−2.10) 
ROAt −0.0105*** −0.0017 −0.0008 
 (−2.88) (−0.99) (−0.83) 
DTURNt 0.0544*** 0.0270*** 0.0124*** 
 (12.96) (13.25) (11.11) 
NCSKEWt 0.0022*** 0.0008*** 0.0005*** 
 (4.63) (3.49) (4.28) 
SIGMAt 0.6941*** 0.1352*** 0.1249*** 
 (11.35) (4.49) (7.76) 
RETt 0.0743*** 0.0207*** 0.0148*** 
 (12.33) (6.99) (9.35) 
BETAt 0.0100*** 0.0037*** 0.0015*** 
 (8.74) (6.83) (5.08) 
EARNVOLt −0.0023 −0.0037 −0.0018 
 (−0.47) (−1.56) (−1.38) 
CFVOLt −0.0040 −0.0034 −0.0006 
 (−0.65) (−1.14) (−0.36) 
SALESVOLt 0.0088*** 0.0031*** 0.0026*** 
 (5.79) (4.19) (6.75) 
HHIt −0.0006 0.0014 0.0008 
 (−0.11) (0.52) (0.56) 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 42,473 42,473 42,473 
Adjusted R2 0.705 0.710 0.870 
This table presents the results for the regressions of predicted NCSKEWt+1, DUVOLt+1, and CRASHt+1 on our 
readability measure MODFOGt. In the first stage, we run OLS regressions of NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1 and the 
logistic regression of CRASHt+1 on the following readability determinants: AGEt, SIt, NBSEGt, NGSEGt, NITEMt, 
SEOt, MAt, and DLWt, as well as year and industry dummies. This first-stage regression generates predicted 
crash risk conditional on observable determinants of readability. We then replace the raw values of crash risk 
by the predicted values and re-estimate our main model used for Table 3 of the paper. Note that we use OLS 
regressions for all measures, because the predicted value of crash dummy becomes a continuous variable. 
The variable NCSKEWt+1 is the negative skewness of W over fiscal year t+1; DUVOLt+1 is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of the standard deviation of W on down weeks to the standard deviation of W on up weeks, where 
the down and up weeks are, respectively, those with W below and above the mean over fiscal year t+1; 
CRASHt+1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the values of W over the fiscal 
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year t+1 falls 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean W for the fiscal year and zero otherwise; and 
W is the firm-specific weekly return, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from 
estimating an expanded index model including lead and lag terms for the market and industry indexes. We 
define a fiscal year as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-ahead 
bias. The variable MODFOGt is the modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. 
The Fog Index is calculated as (words per sentence + percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture 
readability in the financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three 
syllables but which are not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words 
in calculating MODFOG. See the Appendix of the paper for detailed variable definitions. All the models also 
include an unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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TABLE D.3 
Controlling for firm fixed effects 
 Dependent variable = 
 NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 CRASHt+1 
    
MODFOGt 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.024** 
 (3.42) (2.85) (2.49) 
OPAQUEt 0.025 0.006 −0.038 
 (0.59) (0.31) (−0.31) 
OPAQUEt2 −0.020 −0.006 0.013 
 (−0.90) (−0.62) (0.21) 
LOGMVt 0.182*** 0.086*** 0.399*** 
 (19.54) (21.13) (15.04) 
MTBt 0.002 0.001* −0.004 
 (1.41) (1.65) (−1.06) 
LEVt 0.069* 0.017 0.391*** 
 (1.75) (0.97) (3.62) 
ROAt 0.244*** 0.132*** 0.605*** 
 (5.06) (6.38) (4.45) 
DTURNt 0.169*** 0.082*** 0.470*** 
 (3.31) (3.66) (3.31) 
SIGMAt −0.513 −0.498 −4.478** 
 (−0.69) (−1.56) (−2.14) 
RETt −0.029 −0.023 −0.125 
 (−0.39) (−0.73) (−0.57) 
BETAt −0.015 −0.008 −0.037 
 (−1.24) (−1.52) (−1.07) 
EARNVOLt −0.070 −0.044 −0.227 
 (−0.98) (−1.41) (−1.04) 
CFVOLt 0.172** 0.084** 0.214 
 (2.01) (2.24) (0.86) 
SALESVOLt −0.013 −0.010 −0.012 
 (−0.61) (−1.05) (−0.20) 
HHIt 0.025 0.011 0.087 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.41) 
AGEt −0.007 −0.006 0.030 
 (−0.22) (−0.41) (0.31) 
SIt 0.222** 0.116*** 0.488* 
 (2.38) (2.79) (1.74) 
NBSEGt −0.036* −0.017* −0.024 
 (−1.71) (−1.82) (−0.37) 
NGSEGt 0.016 0.008 0.125** 
 (0.76) (0.84) (1.99) 
NITEMt 0.001** 0.000* 0.001 
 (2.03) (1.94) (0.52) 
SEOt 0.074*** 0.035*** 0.063 
 (3.64) (3.93) (1.20) 
MAt 0.012 0.007 0.053* 
 (1.15) (1.40) (1.80) 
DLWt −0.045 −0.021 −0.076 
 (−0.98) (−1.03) (−0.60) 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No 
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Observations 42,473 42,473 35,227 
Adjusted/pseudo-R2 0.084 0.092 0.029 
This table presents the results for the firm fixed effects regressions of NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1 and the 
conditional logistic regression of CRASHt+1 on our readability measure MODFOGt. The variable NCSKEWt+1 is 
the negative skewness of W over fiscal year t+1; DUVOLt+1 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard 
deviation of W on down weeks to the standard deviation of W on up weeks, where the down and up weeks are, 
respectively, those with W below and above the mean over fiscal year t+1; CRASHt+1 is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if at least one of the values of W over the fiscal year t+1 falls 3.09 or more standard 
deviations below the mean W for the fiscal year and zero otherwise; and W is the firm-specific weekly return, 
defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from estimating an expanded index model 
including lead and lag terms for the market and industry indexes. We define a fiscal year as the 12-month 
period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-ahead bias. The variable MODFOGt is the 
modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is calculated as 
(words per sentence + percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture readability in the financial (versus 
general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables but which are not difficult to 
understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating MODFOG. See the 
Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively.  
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TABLE D.4 
Changes analysis 
 Dependent variable = 
 ΔNCSKEWt+1 ΔDUVOLt+1 ΔCRASHt+1 
    
ΔMODFOGt 0.010*** 0.004** 0.016* 
 (2.62) (2.17) (1.72) 
ΔABACC_DDt 0.031 −0.015 −0.307 
 (0.21) (−0.23) (−0.97) 
ΔLOGMVt 0.340*** 0.165*** 0.251*** 
 (22.77) (24.86) (7.58) 
ΔMTBt 0.001 0.000 −0.000 
 (0.44) (0.46) (−0.03) 
ΔLEVt 0.275*** 0.111*** −0.034 
 (4.26) (3.94) (−0.24) 
ΔROAt 0.385*** 0.184*** 0.345** 
 (5.81) (6.42) (2.40) 
ΔDTURNt −0.046 −0.041 0.061 
 (−0.78) (−1.60) (0.49) 
ΔSIGMAt −15.085*** −5.694*** −7.526*** 
 (−14.77) (−13.21) (−3.78) 
ΔRETt −1.497*** −0.598*** −0.622*** 
 (−14.81) (−14.12) (−3.26) 
ΔBETAt −0.023 −0.011 −0.025 
 (−1.46) (−1.54) (−0.76) 
ΔEARNVOLt −0.066 −0.028 −0.225 
 (−0.58) (−0.57) (−0.91) 
ΔCFVOLt 0.043 0.024 0.231 
 (0.34) (0.42) (0.80) 
ΔSALESVOLt 0.017 0.008 −0.005 
 (0.49) (0.50) (−0.07) 
ΔHHIt 0.115 0.069 −0.226 
 (0.87) (1.18) (−0.70) 
ΔSIt 0.312*** 0.162*** 0.124 
 (2.82) (3.25) (0.52) 
ΔNBSEGt −0.003 −0.004 0.164* 
 (−0.07) (−0.22) (1.85) 
ΔNGSEGt 0.020 0.005 0.167* 
 (0.48) (0.25) (1.75) 
ΔNITEMt 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.62) (0.42) (1.00) 
ΔSEOt 0.013 0.004 −0.009 
 (0.56) (0.41) (−0.17) 
ΔMAt 0.007 0.002 0.002 
 (0.57) (0.40) (0.08) 
ΔDLWt −0.056 −0.039 −0.078 
 (−0.61) (−0.95) (−0.32) 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,613 32,613 27,242 
Adjusted/pseudo-R2 0.049 0.054 0.016 
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This table presents the results for the change regressions of NCSKEWt+1, DUVOLt+1, and CRASHt+1 on our 
readability measure MODFOGt. All the change variables are measured by taking first differences. For the 
logistic regression of ΔCRASHt+1, we drop observations with ΔCRASHt+1 equal to −1. The variable NCSKEWt+1 is 
the negative skewness of W over fiscal year t+1; DUVOLt+1 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard 
deviation of W on down weeks to the standard deviation of W on up weeks, where the down and up weeks are, 
respectively, those with W below and above the mean over fiscal year t+1; CRASHt+1 is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if at least one of the values of W over the fiscal year t+1 falls 3.09 or more standard 
deviations below the mean W for the fiscal year and zero otherwise; and W is the firm-specific weekly return, 
defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from estimating an expanded index model 
including lead and lag terms for the market and industry indexes. We define a fiscal year as the 12-month 
period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-ahead bias. The variable MODFOGt is the 
modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is calculated as 
(words per sentence + percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture readability in the financial (versus 
general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables but which are not difficult to 
understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating MODFOG. ABACC_DD is 
the absolute value of the cross-sectional regression residuals from the Dechow–Dichev (2002) model 
modified by Francis et al. (2005). Specifically, for each industry and year, we estimate a regression of current 
accruals on lagged, contemporaneous, and forward operating cash flows, changes in sales revenue, and 
property, plant, and equipment. See the Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. All the models 
also include an unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE D.5 
Controlling for accounting conservatism, tax avoidance, stock liquidity, CEO overconfidence, and accounting comparability 
 Dependent variable = 
 NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 CRASHt+1 NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 CRASHt+1 
       
MODFOGt 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.024*** 0.008*** 0.003** 0.026*** 
 (3.89) (3.08) (3.22) (2.67) (2.01) (2.68) 
CSCOREt −0.658*** −0.311*** −1.071** −0.372* −0.196** −0.573 
 (−4.16) (−4.42) (−2.26) (−1.75) (−2.08) (−0.92) 
LRETRt −0.061*** −0.024** −0.147** −0.054** −0.019 −0.177** 
 (−2.90) (−2.51) (−2.24) (−1.98) (−1.54) (−2.06) 
LIQt 0.037*** 0.013*** 0.077*** 0.042*** 0.016*** 0.067** 
 (5.40) (4.55) (3.03) (4.50) (3.93) (2.09) 
OCt 0.032*** 0.013*** 0.069*** 0.035*** 0.012** 0.061* 
 (3.65) (3.25) (2.62) (3.12) (2.44) (1.81) 
ACCTCOMPt    −0.011 −0.003 −0.040 
    (−0.52) (−0.33) (−0.64) 
OPAQUEt 0.058 0.025* 0.075 0.027 0.009 0.043 
 (1.64) (1.65) (0.77) (0.57) (0.44) (0.33) 
OPAQUEt2 −0.035* −0.014 −0.059 −0.020 −0.004 −0.055 
 (−1.68) (−1.54) (−1.07) (−0.66) (−0.28) (−0.71) 
LOGASSETt 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.008 0.029*** 0.016*** 0.032 
 (4.21) (5.29) (0.48) (4.13) (5.03) (1.54) 
MTBt 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.009 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.011 
 (4.95) (5.13) (1.30) (3.69) (3.56) (1.22) 
LEVt −0.132*** −0.076*** 0.021 −0.175*** −0.092*** −0.048 
 (−4.26) (−5.55) (0.23) (−4.35) (−5.19) (−0.41) 
ROAt 0.415*** 0.212*** 0.958*** 0.392*** 0.203*** 0.963*** 
 (10.76) (12.83) (8.58) (7.62) (9.30) (6.53) 
DTURNt 0.222*** 0.109*** 0.471*** 0.206*** 0.103*** 0.281 
 (4.65) (5.20) (3.39) (3.36) (3.79) (1.54) 
NCSKEWt 0.014** 0.006** 0.030* 0.016** 0.007** 0.032 
 (2.35) (2.36) (1.95) (2.08) (2.13) (1.57) 
SIGMAt 3.937*** 1.145*** 8.752*** 4.323*** 1.462*** 10.803*** 
 (6.53) (4.36) (4.61) (5.30) (4.15) (4.18) 
RETt 0.434*** 0.172*** 1.189*** 0.474*** 0.207*** 1.422*** 
 (6.53) (5.93) (5.16) (5.11) (5.18) (4.42) 
BETAt 0.038*** 0.015*** 0.038 0.040*** 0.016*** 0.033 
 (4.03) (3.63) (1.37) (3.35) (3.08) (0.93) 
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EARNVOLt 0.056 0.011 0.072 0.093 0.006 0.107 
 (0.97) (0.44) (0.50) (1.06) (0.16) (0.46) 
CFVOLt 0.016 0.004 0.190 0.031 0.042 0.281 
 (0.24) (0.14) (1.12) (0.30) (0.92) (1.04) 
SALESVOLt 0.036*** 0.013** 0.035 0.056*** 0.022** 0.055 
 (2.74) (2.31) (0.92) (2.61) (2.45) (0.95) 
HHIt 0.005 −0.006 0.017 0.056 0.021 −0.004 
 (0.12) (−0.35) (0.17) (1.20) (1.03) (−0.03) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 42,133 42,133 42,133 25,820 25,820 25,820 
Adjusted/pseudo-R2 0.040 0.050 0.023 0.036 0.045 0.024 
This table presents the results for the OLS regressions of NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1 and the logistic regression of CRASHt+1 on our readability measure 
MODFOGt, controlling for accounting conservatism (CSCORE), tax avoidance (LRETR), stock liquidity (LIQ), CEO overconfidence (OC), and accounting 
comparability (ACCTCOMP). The variable NCSKEWt+1 is the negative skewness of W over fiscal year t+1; DUVOLt+1 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
the standard deviation of W on down weeks to the standard deviation of W on up weeks, where the down and up weeks are, respectively, those with W 
below and above the mean over fiscal year t+1; CRASHt+1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the values of W over the 
fiscal year t+1 falls 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean W for the fiscal year and zero otherwise; and W is the firm-specific weekly return, 
defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from estimating an expanded index model including lead and lag terms for the market 
and industry indexes. We define a fiscal year as the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end to avoid look-ahead bias. The variable 
MODFOGt is the modified version of the Fog Index for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is calculated as (words per sentence + 
percentage of complex words) × 0.4. To capture readability in the financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three 
syllables but which are not difficult to understand in the financial context and reclassify them as simple words in calculating MODFOG. CSCORE is the 
conservatism measure developed by Khan and Watts (2009). LRETR is the sum of income taxes paid (#txpd) over the past five years divided by the sum 
of pretax income (#pi) minus special items (#spi) over the same five-year period. Higher values of LRETR indicate lower levels of tax avoidance. LIQ is −1 
times Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity. OC is the firm-level measure of overconfidence developed by Schrand and Zechman (2012). Specifically, OC 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm satisfies at least three of the following five criteria and zero otherwise: (i) the firm’s excess 
investment is above the industry–year median, where excess investment is the residual from estimating a regression of asset growth (#at) on sales 
growth (#sale) for each fiscal year; (ii) the firm’s acquisition expenditure (#aqc) scaled by total assets (#at) is above the the industry–year median; (iii) 
debt-to-equity ratio is above the industry–year median, where debt-to-equity ratio is long-term debt (#dltt) divided by market value of equity (#csho × 
#prcc_f); (iv) the firm makes no dividend payment (#dv and #dvc); and (v) the firm has a positive value of convertible debt and preferred stock 
(#dcpstk). ACCTCOMP is the yearly decile ranking (standardized to the range of 0 to 1) of the average of the firm’s top 4 comparability scores during the 
year (De Franco et al. 2011). LOGASSET is the natural logarithm of total assets (#at). We use LOGASSET rather than LOGMV in this table to minimize the 
multicollinearity problem because the latter is used to construct CSCORE. See the Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. All the models 
also include an unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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TABLE D.6 
Alternative proxies for readability 
Panel A: NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
MODFOGt      0.008***   
     (3.43)   
MODFLESCHt 0.003***     0.003***  
 (3.00)     (2.78)  
RAWFOGt  0.007***     0.007** 
  (2.60)     (2.41) 
LENGTHt   0.021***     
   (3.16)     
FILESIZEt    0.007 −0.000 0.003 0.004 
    (1.19) (−0.00) (0.49) (0.68) 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 
        
Panel B: DUVOLt+1 as the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
MODFOGt      0.003***   
     (2.76)   
MODFLESCHt 0.001**     0.001**  
 (2.14)     (2.02)  
RAWFOGt  0.002**     0.002* 
  (1.96)     (1.86) 
LENGTHt   0.006**     
   (2.15)     
FILESIZEt    0.002 −0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.69) (−0.25) (0.19) (0.30) 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
        
Panel C: CRASHt+1 as the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
MODFOGt      0.018**   
     (2.44)   
MODFLESCHt 0.008**     0.007**  
 (2.44)     (2.25)  
RAWFOGt  0.012     0.010 
  (1.38)     (1.21) 
LENGTHt   0.056***     
   (2.77)     
FILESIZEt    0.019 0.004 0.009 0.014 
    (1.05) (0.24) (0.52) (0.80) 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 52,879 
Pseudo-R2 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
This table presents the results for the OLS regressions of NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1 and the logistic regression of CRASHt+1 on 10-K readability using 
alternative readability measures. The variables MODFOGt and MODFLESCHt are the modified versions of the Fog Index and the Flesch Reading Ease 
Score, respectively, for the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. The Fog Index is calculated as (words per sentence + percentage of complex words) × 0.4, 
while the Flesch Reading Ease Score is calculated as 206.835 − (1.015 × words per sentence) − (84.6 × syllables per word). To capture readability in the 
financial (versus general) context, we identify a list of 2,028 words that exceed three syllables but which are not difficult to understand in the financial 
context and reclassify them as simple words (two-syllable words) in calculating MODFOG (MODFLESCH). We take the negative value of the Flesch 
Reading Ease Score to make it directionally consistent with the other two readability measures. The variable RAWFOGt is the raw Fog Index for the 10-K 
report filed for fiscal year t, LENGTHt is the natural logarithm of the total number of words in the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t, and FILESIZEt is the 
natural logarithm of the file size (in megabytes) of the 10-K report filed for fiscal year t. All the models include the determinants of crash risk as control 
variables, which are not tabulated in detail here for brevity. See the Appendix for the definitions of the control variables. See the Appendix of the paper 
for the definitions of the other variables. All the models also include an unreported intercept. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Online Appendix E. Using a term-weighting scheme to modify the Fog Index 
We express the percentage of complex words component of the raw Fog Index as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 100 ×
∑ 𝑛𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
 ,                                                         (E.1) 
 
where i denotes words (including both complex and simple words) and j denotes complex 
words and n is the word count. The underlying assumption for the raw Fog Index is that 
each complex word j carries the same weight in determining the readability of a document. 
This is easy to implement but ignores the fact that so-called complex words that appear in a 
larger proportion of documents become familiar or easy to the readers. The words 
financial, company, and director are of this class if we look at all SEC filers, while the word 
telecommunications can also be of this class if we focus on the telecommunications industry. 
To incorporate this complication, we modify the percentage of complex words as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 100 ×
∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑤𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
,                                               (E.2) 
 
where 𝑤𝑗 =
log (
𝑁
𝑑𝑓𝑗
)
log (𝑁)
,                                                                                                                    (E.3) 
 
with N the total number of documents in the population and dfj the number of documents 
with the word j appearing at least once. The term log(N/dfj) comes from one of the most 
common term-weighting schemes in the information retrieval literature and is used by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) to adjust the relative importance of tonal words. We scale 
log(N/dfj) by log(N) to make the weight fall in the range [0,1]. This is an important step, 
because we have to make the modified Fog Index directly interpretable. The new modified 
Fog Index can thus be interpreted as the number of years of formal education needed to 
understand a 10-K report on the first reading for a reader who has experience in reading 
10-K reports and is thus already familiar with this context. 
We design two ways of defining the document population. First, we use all 10-K 
reports filed from 1994 to 2015 as the population. Second, we use 10-K reports filed in this 
period by all firms that operate in the same two-digit SIC industry as the population. While 
the first way treats words such as financial and director as easier to understand than words 
such as telecommunications, the second way treats them similarly. Both ways are 
reasonable, and their relative accuracy depends on whether the reader focuses on an 
individual industry or follows all firms. 
Arguably, the modification method based on a term-weighting scheme is more 
objective, because the discounting factors assigned to each individual word are solely 
determined by a machine that reads all 10-K reports in the population. However, this 
method is applicable to the Fog Index but may not work well for other readability indices 
(e.g., the Flesch Reading Ease Score and the Kincaid Index) because these normally 
consider the number of syllables per word rather than the proportion of multisyllabic 
words. In this case, any term-weighting scheme could result in a non-integer number of 
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syllables, which makes no sense. To illustrate, if we assign 0.5 as the discounting factor for 
the seven-syllable word telecommunications, it would be considered to have 3.5 syllables in 
constructing the modified Flesch Reading Ease Score or the modified Kincaid Index. 
Therefore, the modification method based on term weighting is good for categorizing 
complex words but not for counting syllables. Our main modification method based on a 
self-constructed word list is applicable to any readability indices with a syllable-based 
complex word component, be it the number of multisyllabic words or the number of 
syllables per word. We thus recommend the word list method used in our main test for 
future research in financial disclosure readability. 
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